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Abstract: This paper examines the effectiveness of active labour market policies (ALMP) in improving 
labour market outcomes, especially of low-skilled individuals. The empirical analysis consists of an 
aggregate impact approach based on a pooled cross country and time-series database for 31 advanced 
countries during the period 1985–2010. A novelty of the paper is that the analysis includes aspects of the 
delivery system to see how the performance of ALMP is affected by different implementation 
characteristics. Among the notable results, the paper finds that ALMP matters at the aggregate level. 
Training, employment incentives, supported employment and direct job creation measures show the 
most favourable results, both, in terms of reduced unemployment, but also in terms of increased 
employment and participation. Interestingly, start-up incentives are more effective in reducing 
unemployment than other ALMP policies. Moreover, the positive effects seem to be particularly 
beneficial for the low-skilled. In terms of implementation, the paper finds that the most favourable 
aspect is the allocation of resources to programme administration. Finally, a disruption of policy 
continuity is associated with negative effects for all labour market variables analysed.   
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1. Introduction	
This paper aims to contribute to the debate regarding the effectiveness of activation measures. In 
particular, the purpose of the study is to assess how effective are active labour market programmes 
(ALMP) in improving the labour market outcomes, especially of low-skilled individuals, in bringing them 
back to employment and sustainably integrating them to the labour market. It finds that ALMP does 
matter at the aggregate level. Training, employment incentives, supported employment and direct job 
creation measures show the most favourable results, both for the overall and low-skilled populations. 
Spending in start-up incentives is also effective but mostly in terms of reducing the unemployment rate. 
Importantly, results show that ALMP policies are more effective for the low skilled. The paper includes 
aspects of the delivery system in the analysis to see if differences in the performance of active labour 
market programmes between countries arise from differences in the institutional framework and 
implementation of the policies studied. It finds that the allocation of resources to programme 
administration is most favourable aspect of implementation. Moreover, policies that are implemented 
pro-cyclically have stronger favourable effects during booms but also stronger unfavourable effects 
during crises, confirming the argument in favour of policy continuity. Interestingly, the size of the 
coefficients arising from policy and implementation variables, once interactions are included is 
noticeably higher. This demonstrates that a correct implementation of policies enhances their beneficial 
effect. 
Since the 1990s there is an increased acceptance of the need of activation measures to strengthen the 
link between social protection, labour market policies and employment (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl, 
2008). Today, these policies are widely regarded as an important tool to fight unemployment. As a result, 
expenditure in ALMP is sizeable in most advanced economies and continues to increase. Success of 
ALMP, however, has not been invariably positive. Although some empirical evidence exists that points 
to a positive effect on the probability of finding employment (e.g. Graversen and van Ours, 2008; 
Roshold and Svarer, 2008; Lalive et al. 2005), the effects tend to be relatively small, making it unclear 
whether the positive outcomes are enough to compensate for the costs. Moreover, a central concern that 
remains is the risk that activation measures might be unsuitable to tackle longer-term issues such as 
skills, employability and financial independence, especially among the least employable jobless 
individuals (Carpenter, 2006).  
Importantly, mixed results are in part due to the fact that what we know in terms of the effectiveness of 
activation measures is based on evaluations carried out using micro data. Although these evaluations are 
useful in determining the impact of policies on the individual, they fail to provide evidence on the wider 
economic or social impacts (or the lack of thereof) of such interventions. Indeed, activation measures 
are embedded in ample macroeconomic, labour market and social policy schemes. Hence, measuring 
their effectiveness calls for evaluations that are more comprehensive. This type of analysis, however, has 
not been carried out systematically yet, at least not for the case of ALMP. In fact, only two 
comprehensive studies were carried out at the beginning of the 90s (Layard et al., 1991 and OECD, 
1993), which point to different results with regards to the effect of ALMP on unemployment rates. 
While Layard et al. (1991) find that ALMP have a negative effect on long-term unemployment, OECD 
(1993) argues that results are not robust enough to be conclusive. As such, existing knowledge on the 
aggregate effects of activation measures remains limited. 
3 
 
This paper aims to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. The analysis consists of an aggregate 
impact approach, which is better placed to measure both, the direct and indirect effects of ALMP. This 
will be done by ways of a pooled cross country and time-series analysis based on 31 advanced countries 
for which detailed annual data on different active labour market measures (focusing on those specifically 
targeted to low-skilled individuals) exists for the period 1985–2010. As such, this study contributes to 
the empirical evaluation of activation policies beyond what it is already known in four ways: First, the 
paper is focused on the labour market outcomes of low-skilled individuals that have been among the 
least researched marginalized groups. Second, this paper sheds light on the role of implementation 
strategies in explaining differences in the performance of ALMP between countries, which is another 
existing gap in the debate surrounding the success of activation policies. Third, it provides an update of 
the aggregate assessment approach by extending the time and country coverage of the dataset. Finally, it 
addresses the endogeneity problem that has weakened many of the analyses of ALMP. 
2. Theoretical	justification	and	transmission	mechanisms	
From the theoretical point of view, the traditional justification for ALMP has been to reduce labour 
market imbalances and counteract rigidities and distortions. This comes from the recognition that 
governments cannot address sustainably unemployment through demand expansion alone (Bellmann 
and Jackman, 1996a). ALMP are therefore needed, first, to facilitate the matching process between the 
supply and demand for labour so that a given number of job-seekers is associated with fewer vacancies. 
Moreover, activation measures are expected to boost productivity of the labour force. This increase in 
productivity implies a direct effect of activation measures on programme participants, but there may also 
be general productivity increases associated with externalities. In addition, activation measures are 
expected to maintain the level of effective labour supply by keeping the long-term unemployed and 
other groups of “outsiders” tight to the labour force (Layard and Nickell, 1986; Layard et al. 1991). 
In terms of the transmission mechanisms, activation polices can influence employment and 
unemployment and give raise to a number of different effects in the overall economy working both via 
changes to the wage-setting structure and the demand for labour. Regarding the former, activation 
measures can have three different effects: (i) reduce reservation wages through the increased competition 
arising between newly laid-off workers and those newly activated (Layard et al. 2009); (ii) the wage-
setting structure can be pushed downwards due to the increased efficiency of the matching process since 
employers have fewer incentives to attract labour through higher wages (Johnson and Layard, 1986); yet, 
(iii) activation measures can also increase reservation wages. Indeed, the concept of participating in a 
labour market programme may provide reassurance to wage earners since the risk of welfare loss from 
becoming unemployed is reduced (Calmfors and Skendinger, 1995)  
Moreover, activation measures can affect the demand for labour in four different ways: (i) the improved 
efficiency of the matching process reduces the cost of vacancies – since they are filled more quickly – 
which can provide incentives to increase the number of vacancies. This is equivalent to an increase in 
labour demand (Pissarides, 1990; Carlmfors and Lang, 1995); (ii) activation measures (especially those 
related to training) have also an effect on productivity, which affect labour demand through a scale and a 
substitution effect. Indeed, an increase in the marginal productivity of labour may produce a scale effect 
that shifts labour demand upwards because a fall of the relative unit cost of labour provides an incentive 
to expand output by using more efficient units of labour. There is, however, an additional substitution effect 
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tending to reduce labour demand since one unit of product can be produced by less units of labour. The 
net effect on the demand for labour will be positive if the scale effect dominates the substitution effect, 
which will arise only in markets where labour demand is elastic (Calmfors, 1994). (iii) ALMP can also 
give raise to a signalling effect. Some authors affirm that ALMP have the ability of reducing the 
uncertainty of employers regarding the employability of job applicants when these have participated in a 
programme (OECD, 1993); and (iv) there is a deadweight effect (defined as hirings that would have 
occurred in the absence of the programme) and a substitution effect (jobs created for certain groups 
replace jobs for other groups due to the change in relative wage costs) arising from activation measures 
(Haveman and Hollister, 1991; Bjorklund and Holmlund, 1991, etc.). The two effects mainly apply to job 
creation programmes and mean that regular labour demand would be reduced.       
The direction and magnitude of these individual effects would depend on the type of measure put in 
place and its target group (Appendix 1). According to Keynesian theory, measures aimed to overcome 
structural labour market imbalances (i.e. employment incentives, job-search assistance, public-job 
creation and certain other direct-job creation measures such as those offering hiring credits) can increase 
the level of employment through an income effect and a multiplier effect. In the case of placement 
services and all types of job-search assistance, the benefits to the labour market result from an increased 
effectiveness of search (Schmid et al. 2001, Bellman and Jackman 1996b, OECD, 1993). Assistance with 
job search might also increase the number of vacancies because opening posts becomes less costly for 
firms (Pissarides, 1990; Calmfors and Lang, 1995; OECD, 1993), which in turn expands labour demand. 
On the other hand, these measures, can lead to displacement and substitution effects, when jobs created 
for a certain category of workers replace jobs for other categories (OECD, 1993; Calmfors and 
Skedinger, 1995); and deadweight loss since hirings from the target group might have occurred even in 
the absence of the programme (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). Moreover, some economists predict a 
reduction in search efforts – and a raise in wage pressure – since government support may reduce the 
fear of unemployment (Bellman and Jackman, 1996a; Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). 
Labour-supply-oriented measures (including training, workers’ subsidies, supported employment and 
rehabilitation policies and job rotation and job sharing measures), on the other hand, are expected to 
have little, if any, impact on the level of unemployment by reducing skill bottlenecks (Schmid, 1996). 
Yet, these measures will potentially have a stronger impact on the structure of unemployment by 
reducing the vulnerability of groups that are more exposed to risks in the labour market, such as the 
unskilled or long-term unemployed. This would have a redistributive and reallocating effect on 
employment opportunities. These measures will also increase the competition for available jobs, which is 
expected to reduce wage pressures and provide a favourable climate for job creation (Layard, 1990, in 
OECD, 1993). Search effectiveness can also be improved thanks to these policies, since participating on 
training courses can provide a positive signal to potential employers, reducing uncertainty about the 
employability of job applicants (Bellman and Jackman 1996b; Layard and Nickell, 1986; OECD, 1993). 
More generally, increases in productivity are thought to have positive externalities that contribute to 
general productivity increases (OECD, 1993) and to general technical progress of societies (Calmfors 
and Skedinger, 1995). 
Yet, a number of detrimental effects could be expected as well. First, labour demand can be reduced if 
the scale effect arising from the improved employability of workers is dominated by the substitution 
effect resulting from the fact that a given output can be produced by fewer more efficient workers 
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(Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). Moreover, participants may reduce their search efforts in the 
expectation that the course culminates (i.e. lock-in effect) (Bellman and Jackman 1996b; Calmfors and 
Skedinger, 1995), or if policies mitigate the fear of unemployment among the targeted individuals 
(OECD, 1994).1 Many authors believe, however, that this state dependence is not a sufficient 
explanation (Calmfors and Lang, 1995) and that the assumption of myopia is overrated (Gergory, 1986). 
In general, ALMP that target disadvantaged groups (especially when used in conjunction with benefit 
conditionality) will put pressure on unemployed people to search harder for jobs, which will be 
associated with lower wage pressure and more jobs (Bellman and Jackman 1996a). 
Specifically relevant for this paper, measures that focus on marginal groups (long-term unemployed, low-
qualified individuals, etc.) are expected to maximize the competition effect and augment matching 
effectiveness. Indeed, low-skilled and long-term unemployed have a greater likelihood of falling out of 
the labour force (according to the strict definition) because, victims of discouragement, they have 
stopped looking for a job. ALMP, especially training, can increase their probabilities of finding 
employment by increasing their employability and facilitating matching (Layard et al. 2009).  In this case, 
activation policies are expected to lower reservation wages, which can stimulate labour demand and 
facilitate employment (e.g. Kettner and Rebien, 2007). However, it can also result in wage moderation – 
if alternative options are limited – or in a bigger low-wage sector and even in a higher number of 
working-poor – in the absence of additional policies to raise employability (e.g. Clasen and Clegg, 2006). 
Importantly, the weaker the affiliation of targeted group to the labour market, the less likely it would be 
for activation measures to affect their employment prospects (Layard et al. 2009).   
Importantly, in times of crisis, characterized by high levels of unemployment and low unfilled vacancies, 
a given level of aggregate employment needs to be assumed, which would reduce the effectiveness of 
ALMP. Indeed, when unfilled labour demand is low, ALMP will lead to substitution and displacement 
effects due to its unlikelihood to increase total employment. In this situation, ALMP targeting can be 
justified economically by its potential to affect specific groups even if the aggregate effects of these 
policies are low. As such, redistributing employment opportunities in favour of disadvantaged groups 
(e.g. low-skilled individuals) can be a way to enhance the effectiveness of ALMP (de Koning, 2001). 
3. Empirical	evaluation	studies	
Much has been written about effectiveness of activation measures based on evaluations carried out using 
micro-data and labour market flows, yet very little is known in terms the aggregate impact of these 
policies on the labour market as a whole or on specific groups such as low-skilled individuals. True, the 
existing evaluations carried out using micro-data have proved to be useful in providing reliable results 
regarding the impact of activation policies on the individual. Yet, even if all indirect effects are 
accounted for, which is not generally the case, many macro features of the environment and their 
interaction with the policies of interest, cannot be taken into consideration within this framework. It 
might well be the case, for example, that an ALMP has positive effects on the employment prospects of 
participants but at the expense of non-participants, yielding little or no benefit at the aggregate level. On 
                                                            
1 The above, however, would imply that individuals are myopic in terms of the actual risks they face of unemployment. If this 
were true, myopic individuals would compare themselves with the rest of the population rather than with their vulnerable 
group. This will give them a sense of an increased competition, which will reduce their wage bargain (Bellman and Jackman 
1996a).  
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the other side of the spectrum, policies may appear to have little individual effect but have in practice 
important overall effects2 (de Koning, 2001).  
Although recent studies have attempted to address this issue (Imbens, 2008),3 external validity – i.e. the 
identified effects can only be held to be valid in the contexts in which they were estimated – continues to 
be an important limitation of exercises using micro data. Indeed, some of the most commonly used 
micro estimation techniques remove all common macro effects and require them to be separable from 
any individual effects (e.g. difference in differences), making it impossible to measure the relevance of 
macroeconomic shocks and their potential interaction with policies (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). 
Even when macro shocks can be accounted for, time invariant (within sample period) macro 
characteristics cannot. This is particularly relevant to the evaluation of labour market policy, since the 
wide range of different institutional and macro-economic contexts countries are faced with would not 
allow micro-econometric analysis to come to general conclusions about the effects of labour market 
policies.   
Aggregate impact analyses are therefore necessary to provide a more comprehensive picture of the 
overall effects of ALMP policies. And although some new research has been conducted recently, no 
consensus has been reached yet at this level.   
3.1 	The	flow	model	approach	and	its	predecessors	
At the aggregate level, several models have been used for assessing the impact of ALMP and these 
models have evolved over time. Analyses based on the flow model approach are, by far, the most 
commonly exploited methods to carry out research at the aggregate level in the field of activation 
policies. These models study the direct effects of ALMP on the friction between supply and demand and 
the transitions from unemployment to employment (de Koning, 2001). This type of model assumes an 
inverse steady state relationship between unemployment and vacancies arising from and employment 
adjustment process (Phelps, 1970). According to this function, the probability for an individual to leave 
unemployment depends on the availability of vacancies. In principle, large divergences between labour 
supply and demand should not exist. In reality, however, labour markets correspond to a much more 
dynamic combination of flows of workers across the economy and of jobs being constantly created and 
destroyed, both of which are matched in a sequential time-consuming manner (Ernst et al. 2011). 
According to this approach markets never clear and unemployment is never voluntary. ALMP has thus a 
role to play by increasing the flow from unemployment to employment, but also by decreasing the flow 
from employment to unemployment by means of training, for example.  
                                                            
2 An example of this are training policies aimed to prepare unemployed individuals in occupations in which shortage exists in 
the economy. At the micro-level, it may appear as if these policies had little or no individual effects. Indeed, job chances of 
the unemployed individuals participating in the programme do not increase, since usually targeted individuals for this type of 
programmes have usually good labour market prospects. Yet, at an aggregate level the  benefit is likely to be important 
because other unemployed job seekers (most probably will lower labour market prospects) will benefit from jobs liberated by 
participants in their transition to other segments (de Koning, 2007).     
3 One of the strategies to do so has been to redefine the unit of interest to a higher aggregate that makes the stable-unit-
treatment-assumption more plausible, the downside of this being loss of precision in the use of data. An alternative strategy 
has been to model the interactions required to capture the indirect effects of the general equilibrium (Bourguignon, et.al.; 
2008, Lee and Wolpin, 2006; Lee, 2005; Blundell, et. al., 2004; Dufflo, 2004; Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998). The 
disadvantage associated with this approach is the need for an increased number of assumptions in the theory and more 
extensive datasets in empirical applications (Abbring and Heckman, 2007). 
7 
 
The oldest attempts to measure the impact of ALMP on the efficiency of the functioning of the labour 
market were based on this same line of thinking; this is, on a simplified version of the u/v-curve or the 
Beveridge curve (de Koning, 2001). This approach is born from the observation that high 
unemployment rates usually coincide with low vacancy rates, and vice versa. A number of studies were 
carried out since the mid-60s all through the 70s and 80s to study changes in the efficiency of the 
matching process. Over time, however, these analyses started to throw clear evidence of an upward shift 
of the u/v-curve, indicating that increasing levels of unemployment were associated with the same level 
of the vacancy rate (Driehuis, 1978; Harper, 1980; among others). At the time this finding was 
interpreted as a diminishing efficiency of the matching process. 
During the 80s and 90s, however, several studies challenged this view4 and a number of criticisms arose 
against the simplicity of the u/v-curve analysis and its lack of theoretical background. Authors pointed 
to the heterogeneity of labour as the explanation for the existing frictions in the labour market, which 
they realized occurred at the sub-market level. The flow-approach originates from this evolution of 
economic thought. Indeed, transition functions from unemployment to employment are closely related 
to u/v functions. Proponents of this approach (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989; de Koning and Arents, 
1997) endorsed the notion that the matching function should be studied at a sub-sector or sub-market 
level. Basing the hiring functions on the supply and demand characteristics, this line of research 
proposed to study the matter (i.e. how to facilitate the mobility of workers between sub-markets) at a 
regional level (de Koning, 2007).   
The regional flow-model approach has been increasingly applied during the last decade.5 Empirically, 
advantages of this function include its dynamic character, as well as the possibility of incorporating 
unemployment duration in the analysis. This offers more possibilities to study the aggregate effect of 
ALMP than other approaches based on static relationships (de Koning, 2001). Moreover, this approach 
allows taking regional variations into consideration, which according to some analyses (Schmid et al., 
2001) are central determinants of unemployment. Thus, the argument goes, this approach is one of the 
most effective means to unveil differences in the effectiveness of ALMP. More importantly, traditionally, 
this approach has been praised for its ability to deal with the simultaneity bias inherent in ALMP macro 
evaluations. It is championed that simultaneity bias would normally have a greater effect on 
unemployment equations than on flow models, since the dependant variable in the latter case (i.e. 
hirings) is not the direct object of political decisions (Anxo et al. 2001). In practice, however, this 
depends on the exact specification of the equations chosen6 and the policy reaction function, rather than 
on the model used or on the regional or international configuration of the panel database. In fact, some 
studies based on this approach acknowledge that in spite of numerous efforts to deal with the problem, 
                                                            
4 Warren (1980) and later den Butter and van Ours (1990) showed, for example, that the apparent decrease in the efficiency of 
the matching process was driven by the failure to take into account the duration component in the analysis. By considering 
separate matching functions for the various segments of unemployment by duration, it was shown that the shift in the u/v 
curve was the result of changing growth rates of employment rather than a diminishing efficiency in the matching process.   
5 See, for example, Anxo et al. (2001) for a regional aggregate impact analysis of ALMP in France and Sweden, carried out by 
means of an augmented matching function. Schmid et al. (2001) carried out a similar analysis for Germany with special focus 
on the long-term unemployed. In the same vein, De Koning and Arents (2001) have analysed the matter specifically for the 
Netherlands and Davia et al. (2001) for Spain. More recently, Hujer et al. (2009) used this approach for Western Germany 
and Dauth et al. (2010) for Austria.  
6 Reverse causality is more likely to be found when ALMP related variables are normalized by the labour force, for example 
(Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). 
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their estimations might still be plagued with endogeneity (Schmid et al., 2001; de Koning and Arents, 
2001).  
On the other hand, the use of this kind of model to evaluate labour market policies entails a number of 
problems. First of all, the approach depends on the availability of aggregate quality data relative to the 
functioning of labour markets, both in terms of stocks but also flows. Yet, this information (especially 
data on job vacancies) usually lacks, which means that model specifications are, to some extent, driven 
by the existence of data rather than by theoretical justifications (de Koning and Arents, 2001). For 
example, a number of difficulties arise when attempting to difference between the effects of policies by 
specific population groups since long time series for employment, vacancies and unemployment flows 
according to occupations and educational groups at the regional level is simply not available (de Koning, 
2001). The only sub-group that has so far being included in the regional flow analysis is unemployment 
by duration. Indeed, some authors have extended the analysis to include long-term unemployment 
(LTU) finding that activation policies have a strong impact on the reduction of LTU in Germany and 
Spain (Schmid et al., 2001), but have no significant effects on the outflows from LTU in the Netherlands 
and Spain (de Koning and Arents, 2001; Anxo et al. 2001).   
More importantly, the limitation of this kind of models is that they are suited to determine only the 
direct effects of ALMP, while indirect effects are potentially numerous and significant. It is difficult, for 
example, to interpret gross effects of activation policies in the absence of information about the possible 
effects on wage formation and on productivity. Moreover, total demand and supply for labour are given 
within this framework and therefore the potential effect of wage subsidies or job creation measures on 
total labour demand are excluded from the analysis (de Koning, 2007). Finally identifying the exact 
nature of the measured effect is a challenge too (Anxo et al. 2001). In fact, Bellmann and Jackman 
(1996a) propose this methodology as a measurement of the net effect of labour market policies on the 
matching process (given windfall, substitution and displacement effects on outflows from 
unemployment). 
3.2 	The	macroeconomic	approach	
Meanwhile, a couple of efforts were developed in the late 80s and beginning of the 90s that presented a 
more general model that allowed for the study of the impact of ALMP on a number of critical economic 
variables that have an influence on the labour market (Layard and Nickell, 1986; Layard et al., 1991). 
This macroeconomic approach can be reduced to two form equations (labour demand and wage-setting 
relationships) and one structural equation (the Beveridge curve) (de Koning, 2001). The employment 
equation is a standard labour demand equation depicting the number of workers that firms wish to 
employ given the real wage rate. This relationship depends on factors such as product market 
competition and technological change. The second equation describes real wages as an (upward) 
function of employment. This relationship results from wage bargain but also wage efficiency 
considerations of firms, as well as exogenous variables such as capital intensity, benefits, the level of 
human capital, etc. Finally the Beveridge curve describes the existing frictions of the labour market, 
where the unemployment rate depends on the vacancy rate, as discussed before.  
The main benefit of this approach is that it allows capturing the impact of ALMP on the efficiency of 
the matching process, while also taking into account the indirect effects of ALMP. The model is based 
on the assumption that employability of labour supply is enhanced thanks to ALMP, which facilitates 
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recruitment. Moreover, activation policies could reduce the friction between labour supply and demand, 
which has an enhancing impact on employment. Indirectly however, an increase in employability can 
have an effect on wage formation, which has effects on the labour market and in the overall economy. 
As such, this approach is capable of shedding light on the impact of ALMP on the matching process, on 
the size of the labour force, while also taking into account productivity effects, competition effects 
(insiders vs. outsiders), deadweight loss, and substitution, crowing-out and lock-in effects (Bellman and 
Jackman, 1996; Calmfors, 1994). No other approach allows capturing empirically the overall net effect of 
ALMP on the wide labour market.  
In addition, this approach provides the framework for analysing internationally the impact of activation 
policies, which brings about additional benefits. For instance, over time advanced economies had tackled 
the same labour market challenges in different ways, especially in terms of the implementation of ALMP. 
Carrying out cross-country comparisons (rather than cross-regional ones) before and after policy 
changes allows us to learn much about the effects of these measures (Bellmann and Jackman, 1996a). 
Moreover, an international approach would be preferable to a country-specific time series analysis 
because most of the policy and institutional factors impinging labour show marked disparities from an 
international perspective but only moderate time changes at the national level. Finally, cross-country 
studies reduce the bias inherent in time-series analyses (OECD, 1993). Thus, a cross-country approach 
may provide a better basis for the identification of the potential effects of activation measures (Blöndal 
and Scarpetta, 1998). 
Empirically, however, evidence from international comparisons on the impact of ALMP has been 
contentious. Historically, a major drawback encountered by the proponents of this cross-country 
approach is that the number of policy and institutional factors that can be included in the analysis is 
limited given the lack of comparable data across a large pool of countries. More importantly, 
conventional criticisms to this aggregate-type model have focused on the existence of a simultaneity bias 
(reverse causality). In fact, the econometric foundation of the equations used in macroeconomic studies 
of labour market policy has been often considered relatively weak, due to this problem. Simultaneity bias 
stems from the fact that although the scale of provision of ALMP is meant to affect the unemployment 
rate, the level of unemployment could also drive spending on ALMP if, for example, governments base 
their expenditure decisions on the magnitude of the problem they wish to address.  
During the 90s, the quest for addressing reserve causality focused on defining a medium-term policy 
reaction function that could realistically predict policy spending patterns of governments. Two clearly 
opposed theoretical frameworks arose with regards to this issue. The first one assumed that 
governments based their decisions on a fix level of ALMP spending per unemployed person, which 
could vary slightly over time but that could not adjust fully with unemployment (Layard et al., 1991). 
Under these circumstances, the suggested solution to address the simultaneity problem was to look at 
average unemployment rates and average levels of spending on ALMP per unemployed person over the 
medium-term. If the assumed policy-reaction function were a realistic representation of reality, policy 
stance would indeed be exogenous in the proposed scheme. The second theoretical framework assumed 
that governments committed a given fraction of GDP to spending in ALMP over the medium-term, 
which did not adjust with the unemployment rate (OECD, 1993). In this situation, using ALMP 
spending per unemployed person would produce an endogeneity problem. This brought authors of the 
OECD study (1993) to measure ALMP spending as a share of GDP.  
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Importantly, different assumptions about governments’ policy stance yielded different results with 
regards to the effect of ALMP on unemployment rates. Indeed, while Layard et al. (1991) find that 
ALMP have a negative effect on long-term unemployment, the OECD (1993) study argues that results 
are not robust enough to be conclusive. Unfortunately, it is still far from clear what a correct 
representation of the policy-reaction function is, and it might well be the case that whatever the 
representation, it would not be the same across countries. Conscious of this problem and of the 
importance of providing governments guidance on the effectiveness of activation policies, other efforts 
arose during the decade. These tried to address endogeneity mainly through fixed effects estimators and 
instrumental variables (Calmfors and Skendinger, 1995; Büttner and Prey, 1997; Schmid et al. 2001). 
However, given the incipient knowledge about estimators capable of dealing with reserve causality and 
methods to test the instruments’ strength and overidentifying restrictions, it remained far from clear 
whether or not the endogeneity problem was actually addressed in these studies.  
As such, at the beginning of the last decade, the macroeconomic approach for the study of the impact of 
ALMP reached a dead end due to the lack of an appropriate theoretical framework (Bellmann and 
Jackman, 1996b) and the existence of limited technical solutions to address the persisting simultaneity 
bias. Studies turned to the regional flow-model approach; yet, with no better solutions in terms of 
tackling the persistent simultaneity bias. As a result, despite a growing tendency of governments to use 
activation measures to fight the growing unemployment problem, little progress has been made since to 
unveil the macro impact of ALMP. Further research is therefore needed to provide additional 
knowledge on the effectiveness of ALMP at the aggregate level.  
4. Empirical	specification	
As discussed above, existing knowledge on the aggregate effects of activation measures is still very 
limited. In spite of this, deepening the understanding of the broader effects of these policies is all the 
more relevant today. First, there has been a growing interest in activation measures during the last 
decade, which many countries see as the central policy to combat the persistently high levels of 
unemployment (Section 5). Meanwhile, countries are under tight budgets and given the mixed empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of active labour market policies in boosting the labour market, spending 
on ALMPs is under careful scrutiny. Thus, effective management and implementation of activation 
policies has become a central objective both for governments but also intergovernmental and 
international organisations such as the European Commission and the OECD (European Commission, 
1996; OECD, 1993 and 1994). Finally, the last decade has seen an important development of tools and 
methodologies to treat a wider range of empirical problems. For instance, a variety of econometric 
estimators, technical fixes and diagnostic tests exists today for treating the endogeneity issue.7 Moreover, 
the availability of longer time series allows controlling better the responsiveness of policies and the 
business cycle (Schmid et al., 2001). As such, the potential for capturing the full effects of ALMP and 
deepening the understanding of the effectiveness of these policies has increased. 
                                                            
7  In fact, there are a number of studies that have successfully used these techniques in international empirical analysis of 
labour market policies other than ALMP. Cahuc and Carcillo (2011), for example, used IV and GMM methods in their cross-
country analysis of short time work arrangements during the 2008 recession to treat the endogeneity bias that plagued their 
results. Both IV and GMM methods yielded stable results, successfully correcting the endogeneity bias. In a similar study 
(using somewhat different estimation strategies), Hijzen and Martin (2013), address the problem of endogeneity through the 
use of an instrumental variable for short-time work based on the number of years for which a scheme has been in existence. 
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Based on these new developments, the present paper is a renewed effort to capture the overall effect of 
ALMP at a macroeconomic level. This paper extends the analysis of macroeconomic effects of ALMP, 
beyond what it is already known, in four ways. First, this paper estimates the effect of different active 
labour market policies on employment, unemployment and the participation of the overall population 
and of low-skilled individuals. While the impact of ALMP on long-term unemployed individuals has 
been studied by means of these models (see, for example, Bellmann and Lehmann, 1990; Schmid et al. 
2001), empirical analysis specifically for the low-skilled has not been studied, as far as I could find. As 
such, this paper will fill this existing gap in the macroeconomic analysis of ALMP. Second, this paper 
includes aspects of the delivery system in the aggregate impact analysis to see if differences in the 
performance of active labour market programmes across countries arise from differences in the 
institutional framework of the policies studied. Importantly, studies in which the effectiveness of ALMP 
is linked to its implementation are scarce (Calmfors, 1994; Schmid et al., 2001; de Koning and van Nes, 
1991). Third, this paper provides an update of the aggregate assessment approach by extending the time 
and country coverage of the dataset, from 1975-19938 to 1985-2010 and from around 20 to 31 advanced 
economies. The use of more recent data allows capturing changes in the effects of ALMP during the last 
crisis and comparing these effects with those of other crises. Finally, this paper addresses the 
endogeneity problem that has undermined many of the analyses of ALMP through the use of 
instrumental variables estimated with 2 stages least squares (2SLS). As it is argued later in the paper, 
these methods yield stable results unveiling reliable estimates of the overall net effect of activation 
policies in the labour market.  
4.1 	Description	of	the	model	
In order to assess how effective are active labour market programmes (ALMP) in improving the labour 
market outcomes, especially for low-skilled individuals, a panel data model is estimated in this section 
based on a structural equation with the following simple form:  
ܮܯ ൌ 	݂ሺܣܮܯܲ, ܫܯܲܮ, ܦܥ, ܴܷܵܶܥ, ܫܰܵܶሻ	 
where, LM represents the selected labour market indicators, including those relative to the low skilled; 
ALMP, active labour market policy indicators; and IMPL, indicators relative to implementation 
characteristics. The remaining three groups of variables are controls: DC includes determinants of 
demand conditions, STRUC the structure of the labour market (which influences the speed of 
adjustment to structural change or demand and supply shocks) and INST a range of institutional 
arrangements. 
The analysis consists of an aggregate impact approach based on a pooled cross-country and time-series 
database for 31 advanced countries with yearly information during the period 1985–2010. This allows 
increasing the number of observations and providing greater statistical power.  
4.2 	Selection	of	variables	and	hypotheses		
Dependant variables 
                                                            
8 Bellmann and Jackman (1996b). 
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Seven indicators were selected as dependant variables. The first three measure labour market outcomes 
of the overall population and include the unemployment rate, the employment-to-population ratio and 
the participation rate. The first indicator will allow measuring the effects of ALMP on the long-term 
level of the unemployment rate, but will not say much about whether its reduction is accompanied by 
higher employment or higher inactivity. To get the complete picture, the participation rate is taken into 
account to assess the impact of policies in bringing people back to the labour market and the 
employment rate to evaluate the factors that influence movements in the percentage of the adult 
population that actually has a job.  
Regarding the specific effects of policies on the labour market outcomes of low-skilled individuals, as 
with the first model, I use the unemployment, employment and participation rates of low-skilled 
individuals as dependant variables. In addition, the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals as a 
percentage of total unemployment is used in the analysis. This allows taking into account the effects of 
policies on the issue of the “structuralization” of lack of skills in the labour market (Schmid et al., 2001). 
It is assumed that the higher the concentration of unemployment on the low-skilled, the higher the real 
wage rigidity and the higher the persistence of the unemployment rate – i.e. based on the assumption 
that wages at the lower end are not flexible due to labour institutions in place in charge of protecting 
low-wage incomes (Nickell and Bell, 1997). This type of distribution would also reinforce the argument 
in favour of policies that provide incentives to enhance the demand for low-skilled labour. 
Policy intervention 
In terms of what explains labour market outcomes, the fundamental question of this paper is whether 
ALMP can affect market variables of the overall population and more specifically the low skilled at the 
aggregate level. As discussed above, evidence from cross-country analyses on the effectiveness of ALMP 
has been contentious. The main problem in interpreting existing results arises from the strong 
simultaneity bias present between ALMP spending and unemployment. A correct representation of the 
policy stance of governments – on which base it will be anchored the definition of the policy variable – 
is therefore the first fundamental step to tackle the simultaneity problem. In this paper, it is assumed that 
the medium-term policy reaction function of governments regarding ALMP spending is based on a fixed 
level of expenditure per unemployed individual – which could be somewhat adjusted based on a cyclical 
component (Layard et al., 1991; Bellmann and Jackman, 1996b). This would imply a positive correlation 
between unemployment and total ALMP spending but a negative correlation between unemployment 
and ALMP spending per unemployed individual, which has been tested and is indeed the case for the 
panel of countries analysed in this paper. Following this representation of the policy stance, the policy 
intervention measure computed for the analysis is defined as real expenditure on ALMP per unemployed 
person (Heylen, 1993; Bellmann and Jackman, 1996b).9  
As discussed in Section 2, in theory, ALMP is expected to reduce labour market imbalances and 
counteract rigidities and distortions, thus improving labour market outcomes. Different policies, 
however, can produce different effects depending on their objective, design, population targeted and 
implementation characteristics (see also Appendix 1). Placement services and all types of job-search 
                                                            
9 The ratio of government expenditure in ALMP to GDP has also been used in the past (OECD, 1993). In this paper, this 
definition may not represent the correct policy stance of governments since in our sample of countries, the ratio ALMP to 
GDP does not remain constant over time, but declines even when considering only periods of economic growth.  
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assistance can increase the level of employment through an increased effectiveness of search (Schmid et 
al. 2001, Bellman and Jackman 1996b, OECD, 1993) and through an increase in the number of 
vacancies because opening posts becomes less costly for firms (Pissarides, 1990; Calmfors and Lang, 
1995; OECD, 1993). Employment incentives and certain direct-job creation measures (such as those 
offering hiring credits) can increase the level of employment but can also lead to displacement and 
substitution effects, when jobs created for a certain category of workers replace jobs for other categories, 
and deadweight loss (OECD, 1993). Moreover, some economists predict a reduction in search efforts 
since government support may reduce the fear of unemployment (Bellman and Jackman, 1996a; 
Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). 
Labour-supply-oriented measures (including training, workers’ subsidies, supported employment and 
rehabilitation policies and job rotation and job sharing measures), on the other hand, are expected to 
reduce skill bottlenecks but have little, if any, impact on the level of unemployment (Schmid, 1996). Yet, 
these measures will potentially have a redistributive and reallocating effect on employment opportunities 
by reducing the vulnerability of targeted groups. Negative effects may arise as well if participants reduce 
their search efforts in the expectation that the course culminates (i.e. lock-in effect) (Bellman and 
Jackman 1996b), or if policies mitigate the fear of unemployment among the targeted individuals 
(OECD, 1994). Finally, the overall effect on labour demand will depend on whether the scale effect 
arising from the improved employability of workers is dominated by the substitution effect resulting 
from the fact that a given output can be produced by fewer more efficient workers (Calmfors and 
Skedinger, 1995). 
Implementation 
Moreover, a group of variables measuring the implementation of policies has been included in the 
analysis. As seen above, financial resources per participant matter in terms of the effectiveness of 
ALMP, but the design and implementation of programmes is crucial as well (OECD, 1993). Different 
policies have different effects depending on their target or their interaction with labour market 
institutions and other specific characteristics (Appendix 1). What is more, in spite of the positive 
expected theoretical effects and the bulk of resources allocated to them, measures could have a small or 
even negative impact if they are badly targeted or incorrectly implemented.    
With this in mind, four proxies have been calculated to measure implementation-related aspects. First, 
public expenditure on programme administration (as a percentage of total expenditure in ALMP) has 
been included to measure the size of the allocation of resources to the implementation of policies.10 It is 
to be expected that policies will be more effective in countries that have higher spending on programme 
administration per unemployed individual, since that would imply that programmes are better resourced 
and that their administration is better equipped to deliver employment services efficiently.    
In addition, the continuity and timing of policies may also have an impact on the effectiveness of 
policies (Schmid, 1996). It is expected that large fluctuations in public spending (i.e. exceeding cyclical 
                                                            
10 This measure was criticized by Schmid (1996) because it does not provide information regarding its relationship to the level 
of unemployment. The author uses instead expenditure on ALMP as a percentage of GDP for each percentage point of 
unemployment as a standardized measure for the degree of fiscal commitment to the objective of full employment. This 
indicator, however, relies on the assumption that “the function of active labour market policy with respect to employment is 
the same for all levels of unemployment” (p. 756, footnote 7), which contradicts the policy stance assumption of this paper.  
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swings) would compromise the stability needed for implementation which would be detrimental in terms 
of effectiveness. Likewise, policies are expected to be more effective if they are implemented in a 
countercyclical manner. In other words, public spending on ALMP would need to run in opposite 
direction of the economic trend and parallel to changes in the unemployment rate. This would thus 
indicate an accurate timing in the implementation of policies.   
Demand conditions 
Moreover, it is assumed that the overall and low-skilled unemployment rates are determined by demand 
conditions, represented here by the growth rate of GDP. It is expected that an increasing demand 
should reduce the level of unemployment or at least slow down its growth. Yet, the effect of an 
increased demand does not have an immediate effect on the labour market. In fact, “structuralization” 
may even increase at first before falling sustainably (Schmid et al., 2001). To take into account this delay, 
a lag has been added to the demand conditions variable.    
Structure of the labour market 
The structure of national labour markets is taken into account as well, since it affects the speed of 
adjustment to shocks and structural change. Two characteristics of the labour market are especially 
interesting for this analysis. First, I included the concentration of the population on a particular skill 
level, measured by the share of the population with tertiary education. It is assumed in this paper that the 
higher the concentration of the high-skilled, the easier it would be for policies to be effective since highly 
educated individuals have more probabilities to find a job. On the other side of the spectrum, a highly 
concentrated population on the low-skilled would imply high competition for low-skilled jobs. 
Moreover, I included the middle- and high-skilled unemployment rates to control for the effects of large 
differences in unemployment rates across skill groups. However, results were not robust when both rates 
were used in the analysis, thus the middle-skilled unemployment rate was dropped to avoid the presence 
of multicollinearity.   
Institutional arrangements  
There was also an attempt to control for differences in institutional arrangements that can affect wage 
bargaining and macroeconomic performance. Union density (the proportion of workforce unionized) 
was included to control for insider power in wage bargaining, which may push wages upwards at a cost 
of lower employment (Layard et al. 2009), especially for groups whose labour supply is more elastic 
(Bertola et al., 2002) – e.g. low-skilled workers. Finally, the OECD index measuring the strictness of 
EPL for the layoff of temporary workers was included. Temporary layoff regulation may decrease the 
search effectiveness of the unemployed since workers who lose their jobs can be recalled. This reduces 
search effectiveness, with detrimental consequences on the level of employment (Bellmann and 
Jackman, 1996b).  
Pure control variables 
Finally, a dummy variable was added taking the value of 1 for countries that are members of the 
European Union. EU countries have a relatively integrated labour market due to the freedom in the 
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movement of workers between these countries. The EU variable has been therefore included to control 
for this special feature of the European labour market.   
4.3 	Empirical	strategy	
Seven different models have been estimated to measure the effectiveness of ALMP. The first three 
measure the effects of ALMP on labour market outcomes of the overall population and the other four 
the effects of policy variables on the specific target group of this analysis, the low-skilled.11 For each 
specification, fixed effects, random effects and pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) models have been 
estimated. The appropriateness of the random- or fixed-effects specification has been tested by the 
Hausman test. In certain cases (employment rate, LFPR, low-skilled employment rate and low-skilled 
LFPR) a correlation of the entities’ errors terms with the regressors was found, which invalidated the use 
of random effects. A fixed-effects model was used in these four cases.   
Moreover, serial correlation is usually expected in macro panels with long time series like the one used in 
this paper, especially as a result of omitting variables that change gradually over time (Lusinyan and 
Bonato, 2007). I used the Lagram-Multiplier test (Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker, 2003) and the abar post-
estimation technique (Roodman, 2006) to test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error terms. In all 
cases, the null hypothesis was rejected, concluding that the data suffered from first order autocorrelation. 
Under this circumstance, OLS, random- and fixed-effects models are biased and/or inconsistent, since 
they underestimate standard errors of the coefficients. An additional estimator was therefore used in all 
specifications: a feasible generalized least squares model (GLS) fitted for panel-data. This estimator 
allows for the assessment in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within panels, cross-sectional 
correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. Results of the pooled ordinary least squares model 
(OLS), GLS (either fixed- or random-effects), and FGLS with AR1 correction are detailed in columns 1, 
2 and 3, respectively, of the tables presented in Appendix 2.  
In addition, as discussed above, given the specification of the models and the shape of the labour market 
policy variables, it can be expected that the different estimations will suffer from endogeneity or reverse 
causality. Indeed, it is not only ALMP that affect unemployment but it may also be the case that changes 
in unemployment could influence expenditure in ALMP. Under these circumstances, it has been widely 
demonstrated that coefficients estimated through OLS and GLS might be inconsistent and biased. Some 
authors have dealt with this problem by either normalizing ALMP to a fixed fraction of GDP over the 
medium-term or by using country-specific averages of ALMP expenditures over the period analysed. 
Neither solution is optimal in my view: the former assumes a policy stance that is not a correct 
representation of reality – at least in the panel of countries chosen for this study, as discussed above – 
and the latter eliminates the time varying property of the variables of analysis, something that seems 
incorrect giving the long period studied. To address the specification problem caused by reserve causality 
and take account of the presence of heteroskedasticity in a more optimal manner, a final estimation was 
carried out, instrumenting (i.e. finding variables correlated with the endogenous variables, but not 
correlated with error term) for the policy cluster and job rotation and job sharing variables and for the 
                                                            
11 Dependent variables were controlled for non-stationarity through the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. In all cases (but one) 
the tests rejected the null hypotheses of non-stationarity at 1 and 5 per cent levels. The exception was the variable share of low-
skilled unemployed individuals which did not pass the test and can be therefore assumed to be non-stationary. 
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implementation-related variables continuity and timing through a 2 stages least squares (2SLS) estimator.12 
The discussion of the results of this estimation and the tests and options used are discussed in Section 
6.3 and presented in Appendix 6.  
5. Data	and	descriptive	statistics	
5.1 		Construction	of	the	database	
The variables used in the analysis draw from different sources of information. The exact definitions and 
sources can be found in  Table 1. Labour market variables (employment, unemployment, labour force 
and working age population) for the overall population for the 31 member states analysed in this paper 
were collected from the Labour Force Survey dataset of OECD.13  
Moreover, the low-skilled unemployment rate and the employment-to-population ratio of the low-skilled 
draw from the Eurostat database for the 23 European countries for which information is available in this 
dataset. For the remaining countries, I used ILO databases14 to draw information for the low-skilled 
unemployment rate of Australia, Canada, Israel, Mexico and the United States; and national sources for 
Japan, Korea and New Zealand. Regarding the low-skilled employment rate, I used OECD Education at 
a Glance indictors (2004–2012) to gather information for Australia, Israel and Mexico, and national 
sources for Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and the United States. The participation rate was 
calculated on the basis of the unemployment and employment rates. Finally, the share of low-skilled 
unemployed individuals as a percentage of total unemployment was gathered from the World 
Development Indicators database of the World Bank. Information in this database exists for the whole 
sample of countries, but data is more scattered in terms of number of years for which information exists 
– e.g. the latest year for which information is available is 2008. 
Skill level is measured by the level of educational attainment as defined by the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) (UNESCO, 1997). As such, in this analysis low-skilled are 
individuals with pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education (levels 0-2 of ISCED), middle-
skilled are those with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3-4) and the 
high-skilled are individuals that have finalized tertiary education (levels 5-6). The definition of the 
variable in countries where information was gathered from national sources varies slightly. In Japan, low-
skilled are individuals with primary school, junior or senior high school, middle-skilled those with junior 
college, and high-skilled are people that have coursed college or university, including graduate school. In 
Korea, low-skilled are middle-school graduates and under, middle-skilled are high school graduates and 
high-skilled are college and university graduates. In New Zealand, low-skilled are individuals with no 
school qualification, middle-skilled those with either school qualification or post school but no school 
qualification and high-skilled those with post school and school qualification. Finally, the low skilled 
category in Canada and the United States includes persons with no schooling and persons who received 
some schooling but did not obtain a secondary or high school diploma.  
                                                            
12  The variable start-up incentives was not included among the endogenous variables because the results of the C test of 
exogeneity did not favour its inclusion. Indeed, when the orthogonality conditions of the model including this variable as 
exogenous were tested, the C test indicated robust results.  
13 All variables obtained from OECD, were gathered from OECD.Stat, which is an online repository of data and metadata 
for OECD countries and selected non-member economies.  
14 KILM (Key Indicators of the Labour Market) and ILO.Stat. 
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In addition, variables related to policy intervention (expenditure in active labour market policies) derive 
from OECD Employment Outlook databases and thus the categories used follow its classification and 
definitions. These categories include: 
 Training: Public expenditure in targeted training programmes including institutional, workplace 
and integrated training and special support for apprenticeships.  
 Job rotation and job sharing: Public expenditure in job rotation includes programmes promoting the 
full substitution of an employee by an unemployed person or a person from another target group 
for a fixed period. Job sharing schemes includes all measures promoting the partial substitution 
of employees by an unemployed person or a person from another target group.  
 Employment incentives: Public expenditure in recruitment and employment maintenance incentives.  
 Supported employment and rehabilitation: Includes public expenditure in measures to support 
employment, which consists of subsidies for the productive employment of persons with a 
permanently (or long-term) reduced capacity to work; and in rehabilitation, which refers to 
vocational rehabilitation for persons with a reduced working capacity.  
 Direct job creation: Public expenditure in programmes aimed to create additional jobs for the long-
term unemployed or persons otherwise difficult to place. Jobs created are usually of community 
benefit and are usually located in the public or non-profit sectors. Provisions for lifetime 
sheltered work in a non-productive environment should not be included. 
 Start-up incentives: Public expenditure in programmes that promote entrepreneurship among 
unemployed and target groups. 
Measures included in the analysis are restricted to targeted policies. This excludes measures that are 
generally available (e.g. in-work benefits that are available to all employees whose earnings fall below a 
threshold, or training and apprenticeship programmes that are generally available to employed adults or 
youth, etc.). Box 1 illustrates how different country specific policies fit the ALMP categories described 
above.    
For each category, the variable computed was defined as real expenditure per unemployed person, 
following the policy stance analysis discussed above (i.e. which illustrates how countries in our sample 
take decisions regarding expenditure on ALMP). For comparability across countries, expenditures were 
converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. In order to deal 
with the multicollinearity arising between policy variables, a cluster (Policy Cluster) was calculated 
bringing together training, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, and direct 
job creation policies.  
Box 1.  Country specific interventions and how they fit the different ALMP categories 
This Box presents a list of all interventions reported by the government of Austria in 2011, grouped by type of 
active labour market policy according to the OECD categories defined above. 
1. Austria 
Training: 
Institutional training: Promotion of occupational mobility (course cost and course related cost); Promotion of 
occupational mobility (living allowance); Support for training in institutions; Employment foundations; Further 
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training allowance* (Institutional training).
Workplace training: Support for training in enterprises (encourage persons in enterprises to participate in training 
measures – support for qualification of employees); Vocational training for the disabled. 
Alternate training: None reported 
Special support for apprenticeship: Promotion of apprenticeship training and vocational training; Supra-company 
apprentice training. 
Job rotation and job sharing: 
Job rotation: Further training allowance 
Job sharing: Solidarity premium model (SOL); Promotion of job sharing during part-time parental leave. 
Employment incentives: 
Recruitment incentives: Promotion of regional mobility and entry into employment (travel allowance); Promotion of 
regional mobility and entry into employment (childcare allowance); Integration subsidy (EB); Allowance for 
enterprises without employees. 
Employment maintenance incentives: Promotion of investment and restructuring. 
Supported employment and rehabilitation: 
Supported employment: Support for employment of the disabled through the BSBs; Integration enterprises (BSB). 
Rehabilitation: None reported. 
Direct job creation: 
Socio-economic enterprises (SÖB) and non-profit employment projects (GBP); Childcare institutions. 
Start-up incentives: 
Business start-up programme (UGP+GB). 
Notes: *Component of another program 
Source: Eurostat (2013a). 
One of the novelties of the analysis presented in this paper is the inclusion of implementation-related 
variables to measure the efficiency of ALMP analysis. Three performance indicators were constructed 
capturing three different dimensions of policy implementation: allocation of resources to the 
implementation of policies, continuity and timing in the implementation of programmes. The first 
dimension is measured by the overall expenditure on programme administration15 as a percentage of 
total expenditure in ALMP. Second, following Schmid (1996), continuity in the implementation of 
programmes is measured by the dynamics of ALMP expenditure. Large annual variation in programme 
spending (fluctuations that exceed cyclical swings) would be the antithesis of continuity in 
implementation. This variation was captured by the difference between the fluctuation (measured by the 
standard deviation) in real GDP growth and that of the growth rate of expenditure in ALMP. Third, as 
explained above, the variable timing measures whether policies are implemented in a countercyclical or 
pro-cyclical manner (Schmid, 1996). To assess this, the regression coefficients between ALMP spending 
                                                            
15 Defined by governments’ expenditure in Public Employment Services, including: (ii) public expenditure in placement and 
related services such as referral to work opportunities, counselling and case management, training and other forms of 
assistance; (ii) benefit administration; and (iii) other services and activities, including both, the budget of institutions that 
manage placement and related services and ALMP but also the budget of institutions that administer the unemployment and 
early retirement benefits. It is important to note that in some countries the share of PES expenditure corresponding to the 
latter two subcategories might be significant. For example, Belgium, Italy, New  Zealand and the United States have a 
significant share of (ii) in their total PES. Moreover, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic and Spain, have a significant portion of (iii); and in Ireland the mix of both categories represents the biggest share. 
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and both output and unemployment were calculated. A dummy variable was then created taking the 
value of 1 if expenditure on ALMP ran parallel to changes in the unemployment rate and counter the 
economic trend (i.e. when policies were implemented counter-cyclically) and 0 otherwise.  
Regarding the demand conditions variable, GDP was taken from the OECD Economic Outlook dataset 
and draw from National Accounts. In addition, as explained above two aspects of the labour market are 
included to control for the structure of the labour market: the share of the population with tertiary 
education and the middle- and high-skilled unemployment rates. The former variable has been gathered 
from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. The latter two variables were 
gathered from the same sources from where the low-skilled unemployment rates were drawn. Finally, 
the two variables related to institutional arrangements – i.e. union density and strictness of employment 
protection for temporary employment – come, respectively, from the ICTWSS16 and EPL databases of 
the OECD. EPL is measured by Version 1 of the indicator since it contains annual information since 
1985 (although this version does not incorporate all the data items included in Version 3)17.  
The analysis is based on data for 31 OECD countries over a 25-year period, 1985–2010, which yields a 
total of 806 observations. However, information is not usually available for all countries for every year 
so most of the regressions are based on a smaller data set. For example, the number of countries is 
reduced to 27 when the different equations are carried out through the FGLS estimator with correction 
for first-order autocorrelation (i.e. the preferred specification) due to the unavailability of information 
about union density and EPL for temporary workers for Israel, Estonia, Luxembourg and Slovenia. 
  Table 1.  Definitions and sources of variables used in the regression analysis 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent:   
Unemployment rate Unemployed persons aged 15-64 as a percentage of the labour force OECD. Stat 
Employment-to-population ratio Employed persons aged 15-64 as a percentage of the population of the same age (working-age population). OECD. Stat 
Labour force participation rate 
Employed and unemployment persons aged 15-64 as a 
percentage of the population of the same age (working-
age population). 
OECD. Stat 
Low-skilled unemployment rate  
Low-skilled unemployed individuals as a percentage of 
the total low-skilled in the labour force. 
Low-skilled are individuals with pre-primary, primary 
and lower secondary education (levels 0-2 of ISCED). 
Age definition varies according to different sources: 15-
64 in the case of Eurostat data; 15+ for ILO data and data 
gathered for Canada, Japan, Korea and New Zealand; and 
25-64 in the case of OECD data. 
Eurostat, ILO and 
National sources 
Low-skilled employment-to-
population ratio 
Low-skilled employed individuals as a percentage of the 
total low skilled in working-age. 
Low-skilled are individuals with pre-primary, primary 
Eurostat, OECD 
and National 
sources 
                                                            
16 Visser (2011). 
17 This is, item 16 (authorisation and reporting requirements for TWAs) and 17 (equal treatment for TWA workers) 
(www.oecd.org/employment/protection). 
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and lower secondary education (levels 0-2 of ISCED). 
Age definition varies according to different sources: 15-
64 in the case of Eurostat data; 15+ for ILO data and data 
gathered for Canada, Japan, Korea and New Zealand; 25-
64 in the case of OECD data; and 25+ for the US data. 
Low-skilled labour force 
participation rate 
Low-skilled employed and unemployment persons aged 
15-64 as a percentage of the population of the same age 
(working-age population). 
Author’s 
calculations based 
on the low-skilled 
employment and 
unemployment 
rates. 
Share of low-skilled unemployed 
individuals 
Share of unemployed with primary education as a 
percentage of total unemployment. 
World Bank, WDI 
database 
Independent:   
Policy intervention:   
Policy Cluster 
Public expenditure in training, employment incentives, 
supported employment and rehabilitation, and direct job 
creation policies. 
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Public expenditure in training 
Public expenditure in institutional, workplace and 
integrated training and special support for apprenticeship.  
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Public expenditure in job rotation 
and job sharing 
Public expenditure in job rotation and job sharing 
schemes.  
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Public expenditure in employment 
incentives 
Public expenditure in recruitment and employment 
maintenance incentives.  
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Public expenditure in supported 
employment and rehabilitation 
Public expenditure in supported employment and 
rehabilitation programmes.   
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Public expenditure in direct job 
creation 
Public expenditure in programmes aimed to create 
additional jobs.  
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Public expenditure in start-up 
incentives 
Public expenditure in programmes that promote 
entrepreneurship.  
Measured as expenditure in thousands of US$ (PPP) per 
unemployed individual. 
OECD. Stat 
Implementation:   
Allocation of resources for the 
implementation of policies 
Public expenditure on programme administration (PES) as 
a percentage of total ALMP expenditure.  
Author’s 
calculations based 
on OECD. Stat 
Continuity of programmes 
implemented 
Difference between the standard deviation of real GDP 
growth and the standard deviation of the growth rate of 
real expenditure in ALMP during the whole period of 
Author’s 
calculations based 
on Schmid (1996) 
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analysis. 
Timing in the implementation of 
programmes  
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when policies are 
implemented countercyclically (i.e. regression coefficient 
between ALMP spending and output is negative and that 
of ALMP spending and unemployment is positive); and 0 
otherwise. 
Author’s 
calculations based 
on Schmid (1996) 
Demand Conditions:   
Real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) Annual growth rate of real GDP OECD. Stat 
Structure of the Labour Market:  
Share of the population with 
tertiary education School enrolment, tertiary (% gross). 
World Bank, WDI 
database 
Middle-skilled unemployment rate 
Middle-skilled unemployed individuals as a percentage of 
the total middle-skilled in the labour force. 
Middle-skilled individuals are those with upper secondary 
and post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3-4 of 
ISCED). 
Eurostat, ILO and 
National sources 
High-skilled unemployment rate 
High-skilled unemployed individuals as a percentage of 
the total high-skilled in the labour force. 
High-skilled individuals are those that have finalized 
tertiary education (levels 5-6 of ISCED). 
Eurostat, ILO and 
National sources 
Institutional arrangements:   
Union density 
Ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union 
members, divided by the total number of wage and salary 
earners. 
OECD. Stat 
EPL for temporary workers 
Strictness of regulation on the use of temporary contracts. 
Version 1 (1985-2008) of the employment protection 
legislation indicator.  
OECD. Stat 
Other controls:   
Member of the European Union Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country is a member of the European Union and 0 if it is not.  
5.2 	Evolution	of	active	labour	market	policies	
Since the 90s there has been a growing interest in activation measures, which many countries see as the 
central policy to combat the persistently high levels of unemployment. Today, expenditure in ALMP is 
sizeable in most advanced economies and continues to increase. Between 2004 and 2009, ALMP 
expenditure grew continuously at an average annual rate of 5.8 per cent, reaching an accumulated growth 
of 32.5 per cent and a total spending of US$176.5 billion (PPP) in the five years to 2009. Only in 2010, 
this expansion ended and ALMP spending fell by close to 0.7 per cent (Figure 1, panel A). ALMP 
expenditure per unemployed individual has also increased in a sustained manner – by an accumulated 
25.5 per cent between 2004 and 2008. In 2009 and 2010, however, this upward trend ended abruptly due 
to the rise in the number of unemployed as a consequence of the crisis.  
In terms of the distribution of expenditure by type of policy, an important share of spending on ALMP 
(excluding PES and administration) remained concentrated in training measures, which represented close 
to 39 per cent of the total in 2010. Spending in employment incentives, direct-job creation and 
supported employment and rehabilitation measures also represented prominent shares with 22.2, 16.8 
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and 15.7 per cent, respectively. The share of expenditure in start-up incentives, on the other hand, 
remains low at 6.2 per cent of total expenditure and that of job rotation and job sharing programmes is 
negligible. Relative to 2004, the different groups of policies have maintained their relative importance, 
with minor exceptions. For example, a small decrease in the share of spending in supported employment 
and rehabilitation measures seems to have given way to an increase in spending in direct-job creation 
measures.    
Importantly, the overall growth in expenditure on active measures during the period 2004–10 was driven 
by training, in spite of a decrease in its share. It accounted for one-third of the total increase in ALMP 
spending (excluding PES and administration) during the period (Figure 1, panel B). Employment 
incentives and direct-job creation measures are the second and third sources of growth in ALMP 
expenditure, accounting for around 27 and 24.5 per cent, respectively. Conversely, spending in 
supported employment and rehabilitation fell during the period, thus its contribution to growth only 
accounted for 7.7 per cent.   
In sum, training continues to be the preferred tool of advanced countries’ governments to address 
labour market problems. Meanwhile, employment incentives and direct-job creation measures have 
become the more and more important. The remaining of this section will test whether targeting 
spending towards these priority policies is the most effective way to address labour market imbalances.   
Figure 1. Evolution of expenditure on ALMP, 2004–2010 
Panel A. Total expenditure on ALMP 
 
 
Panel B. Share of the expenditure by type of ALMP policy in 2004 and 2010 and in the change between 
2004–2010 (percentages of total ALMP expenditure*)
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* Excluding PES and administration. 
Source: OECD.Stat. 
5.3 	Descriptive	statistics	
Basic descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis and their cross-correlations are 
summarized in Tables 2 and 3. 
As shown by the pairwise correlation between the Policy cluster and the three implementation variables 
(Table 3), implementation variables are closely related to policy intervention ones, because the effect of 
policy interventions depends on the quality of implementation. In this situation, interaction terms may 
be needed to avoid a misspecification arising from the omission of these relationships. To avoid this 
problem, I tested a number of interaction terms, three of which proved significant indicating they should 
be added to the model to ensure a correct specification: cluster * PES allocation; cluster * timing; cluster * 
continuity.18 Finally, an additional interaction was added between the variables Cycle and timing to capture 
the fact that countercyclical policies may be more or less effective depending on the moment of the 
economic cycle.  
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Dependent:      
Unemployment rate 731 7.5 3.9 0.6 23.9 
                                                            
18  Omitting relevant interaction terms would constrain the partial derivatives of both Policy Cluster and the three 
implementation variables to be constant rather than varying, as they would be for the equation including the interaction terms 
(Baum, 2006, p. 125).  
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Employment-to-population ratio 731 66.5 8.0 46.9 84.4 
Labour force participation rate 731 71.5 7.1 56.6 86.0 
Low-skilled unemployment rate 511 12.2 7.7 2.1 53.4 
Low-skilled employment-to-population ratio 498 47.0 12.1 13.3 71.9 
Low-skilled labour force participation rate 490 52.7 11.3 24.5 74.5 
Share of low-skilled unemployed individuals 520 36.6 15.5 0.5 78.4 
Independent:      
Policy Cluster (thousand) 652 4.29 4.83 0.04 27.47 
Public expenditure in training (thousand) 659 1.71 1.95 0.00 10.32 
Public expenditure in job rotation and job sharing 
(thousand) 665 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.39 
Public expenditure in employment incentives 
(thousand) 662 0.86 1.44 0.00 13.63 
Public expenditure in supported employment and 
rehabilitation (thousand) 660 0.94 1.92 0.00 14.31 
Public expenditure in direct job creation (thousand) 660 0.79 1.19 0.00 6.46 
Public expenditure in start-up incentives (thousand) 664 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.81 
Allocation of resources to the implementation of 
policies (per cent) 623 0.27 0.17 0.02 0.90 
Continuity of programmes implemented 710 -15.0 14.7 -71.0 -1.2 
Right timing in the implementation of programmes 806 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Cycle (billions) 721 40,389 148,061 5.7 10,43,666 
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 690 2.8 2.9 -14.1 12.3 
Share of the population with tertiary education 729 48.1 21.0 2.4 103.9 
Middle-skilled unemployment rate 510 7.6 4.3 0.0 26.5 
High-skilled unemployment rate 505 4.5 2.4 1.1 18.3 
Union density 689 34.0 19.5 7.1 83.9 
EPL for temporary workers 613 2.0 1.4 0.3 5.4 
Member of the European Union 806 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
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Table 3.  Cross-correlations between independent variables of the model	
 
Cluster 
(Policy 1) Training 
Employment 
incentives 
Supported 
employment 
and 
rehabilitation 
Direct-job 
creation 
Job rotation 
and job 
sharing 
(Policy 2) 
Start-up 
incentives 
(Policy 3) 
Cluster* 
PES 
allocation 
Cluster* 
Timing 
Cycle* 
Timing 
Cluster (Policy 1) 1                  
Training 0.83* 1         
Employment incentives 0.72* 0.51* 1        
Supported employment and 
rehabilitation 0.76* 0.49* 0.29* 1       
Direct-job creation 0.60* 0.31* 0.37* 0.30* 1      
Job rotation and job sharing 
(Policy 2) 0.14* 0.11* 0.09* 0.01 0.27* 1     
Start-up incentives (Policy 3) 0.07 0.13* 0.18* -0.08* -0.03 0.06 1    
Cluster*PES allocation  0.85* 0.61* 0.40* 0.89* 0.50* 0.05 -0.03 1   
Cluster*Timing 0.99* 0.82* 0.69* 0.76* 0.61* 0.15* 0.04 0.84* 1  
Cycle*Timing -0.10* -0.12* -0.06 -0.09* 0.02 -0.04 -0.12* -0.11* -0.09* 1 
PES allocation -0.35* -0.35* -0.31* -0.11* -0.30* -0.17* -0.22* -0.07 -0.33* 0.13* 
Continuity in implementation 0.25* 0.25* 0.13* 0.18* 0.16* 0.13* 0.07 0.31* 0.25* -0.43* 
Correct timing of policies 0.36* 0.35* 0.19* 0.22* 0.28* 0.12* -0.03 0.34* 0.43* 0.14* 
Real GDP -0.10* -0.13* -0.06 -0.09* 0.02 -0.04 -0.12* -0.12* -0.09* 1* 
Growth rate of real GDP -0.09* -0.10* -0.07 -0.09* 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.12* -0.09* 0.10* 
Population with tertiary 
education 0.09* 0.13* -0.02 0.09* 0.02 0.18* -0.11* 0.15* 0.09* 0.18* 
UNR middle-skilled 
individuals -0.42* -0.40* -0.20* -0.32* -0.22* 0.02 0.07 -0.40* -0.42* -0.18* 
UNR of high-skilled 
individuals -0.32* -0.27* -0.11* -0.28* -0.22* -0.06 0.12* -0.32* -0.33* -0.09* 
Union density 0.47* 0.46* 0.48* 0.22* 0.22* 0.35* 0.12* 0.22* 0.48* -0.25* 
EPL (temporary workers) 0.13* 0.11* 0.17* 0.0 0.16* 0.16* 0.04 0.03 0.11* -0.07 
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Error! Reference source not found.. (Cont.)  Cross-correlations between independent variables of the model	
 
PES 
allocation 
Continuity 
in 
implementa
tion 
Correct 
timing of 
policies 
Real GDP Growth rate of real GDP 
Population 
with 
tertiary 
education 
UNR 
middle-
skilled 
individuals 
UNR of 
high-skilled 
individuals 
Union 
density 
EPL 
(temporary 
workers) 
PES allocation 1          
Continuity in implementation -0.10* 1         
Correct timing of policies -0.16*   0.15* 1        
Real GDP   0.13* -0.43*  0.14* 1       
Growth rate of real GDP -0.05 -0.16* -0.04    0.10* 1      
Population with tertiary 
education 0.01 0.04    0.26*   0.18* -0.09* 1     
UNR middle-skilled 
individuals -0.03 -0.09* -0.29*  -0.18* 0.0 -0.03 1    
UNR of high-skilled 
individuals -0.15* 0.02 -0.16*  -0.09* -0.07 0.01 0.73* 1   
Union density  -0.26*   0.23*   0.26* -0.25* -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.11* 1  
EPL (temporary workers) -0.40* 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.12*  -0.24* 0.25* 0.32* 0.08 1 
Notes: * =  significant at  the 5 per cent  level; UNR=Unemployment  rate; Policy variables are measured as public expenditure  in  thousand US$  (PPP) per unemployed  individual; 
Cluster variable includes: training, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, and direct job creation policies.	
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6. Econometric	results	
6.1 	Description	of	results	
Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 below report the effect of expenditures on ALMP on the unemployment, 
employment and labour force participation rates of the overall population and low-skilled individuals 
and on the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals. All models presented in these tables report 
results estimated by FGLS with AR1 correction, which is the preferred specification. For each 
parameter, interactions were added one by one to check whether results change with each addition. This 
allows flagging the size of variations produced by the inclusion of interaction terms which, in most cases, 
are correlated with the underlying explanatory variables.  
Effects on the unemployment rate 
Estimates relative to the unemployment rate are presented in Table 4. Results show that the policy cluster 
(this is public expenditure in training, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation 
and direct job creation measures) has a significant negative effect on the total unemployment rate and 
the unemployment rate of the low-skilled. The effect of start-up incentives on the unemployment rates 
of both groups is also negative and significant. Finally, job rotation and job sharing has a negative but 
non-significant effect on the unemployment rate of these groups, which might due to the fact that 
expenditure in these policies is small in relative terms. Interestingly, in general, ALMP policies seem to 
be more effective in reducing the unemployment rate of the low skilled than that of the overall 
population.  
Importantly, implementation seems to matter too. Raising the share of PES in total ALMP expenditure 
has a reducing effect on the unemployment rate of both population groups but this effect is significantly 
different from zero only in the case of the overall unemployment rate. The variable timing, which 
measures whether policies are implemented in a countercyclical or procyclical manner matters too, 
implying that countercyclical policies (timing=1) have an unemployment reducing effect. Finally, the 
effect of policy continuity is significant only in the case of the low-skilled and has a negative effect as 
well but only once the cycle-timing interaction is included.  
Importantly, the interaction of timing with the policy cluster is also significant and has a positive effect on 
the unemployment rate of both population groups. It suggests that when policies are implemented in a 
countercyclical manner (timing=1), the unemployment reducing effect of the policy cluster is lower.19 
This implies that policies that are implemented procyclically have a stronger unemployment reducing 
effect during booms but also a stronger unemployment enhancing effect during crises. This confirms the 
argument in favour of policy continuity that suggests investing in activation measures during booms 
when resources are available but also during crises when the unemployed need that support the most. 
This argument is also confirmed by the cycle-timing interaction, which is also significant for the low-
skilled. It shows that when policies are implemented countercyclically, the elasticity of the 
unemployment rate to the cycle is lower. The interaction between the policy cluster and the share of PES is 
also significant for the low-skilled group, albeit only at the 10 per cent level. It shows that the 
                                                            
19 Given the equation of the interaction effect: unr = a + b1 cluster + b2 (cluster*timing) + b3 timing + e, the effect of the 
interaction term when timing=1 is given by unr = (b1 + b2)*cluster + b3 and the effect of the interaction term when 
timing=0 is given by unr = b1*cluster. 
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unemployment reducing effect of the policy cluster becomes stronger as more ALMP resources are 
devoted to PES and administration.20  
Interestingly, the size of the coefficients arising from policy and implementation variables, once 
interactions are included is noticeably higher. This demonstrates that a correct implementation of 
policies (e.g. namely right timing and the allocation of resources to PES) enhances the unemployment 
reducing effect of the policy cluster.21     
Other control variables – such as of union density, the share of the population with tertiary education, 
the strictness of employment protection for temporary workers and the unemployment rate of low-
skilled individuals – also show significant effects. As explained above in more detail, these variables have 
been included in the analysis to control for the structure of the national labour markets (which may 
affect the speed of adjustment to shocks and structural change) and for differences in institutional 
arrangements (that can affect wage bargaining and macroeconomic performance). Their coefficients will 
not be analysed in this paper since their individual effects are (at least partly) already taken up by the 
other explanatory variables.22   
Effects on the employment rate 
Table 5 presents the results of the employment rate estimations of the two population groups. By and 
large, these findings show the mirror image of the unemployment rate’s results. The policy cluster has a 
significant positive effect on the employment rate of the overall and low-skilled populations. The effect 
of start-up incentives is also positive but this time is only significant for the overall population. Job 
rotation and job sharing has again a negative but non-significant effect on both employment rates. 
Finally, in line with previous results, ALMP policies seem to be more effective in boosting the 
employment rate of the low skilled.  
The impact of implementation variables also shows the mirror image of unemployment rate estimations. 
An increased allocation of resources towards PES, for example, has a positive effect on the employment 
rate of both population groups but this effect is significantly different from zero only in the case of the 
overall population’s employment rate. Moreover, the effect of policy continuity is positive and significant 
for both population groups suggesting that supporting policy continuity would have a boosting effect on 
the employment rates of the overall and low-skilled populations.  
The interaction term between the policy cluster and the allocation of resources to PES is also significant in 
the case of the low-skilled and is positively correlated. The analysis of this interaction23 illustrates that as 
more ALMP resources are allocated towards PES and administration, the favourable effect of the policy 
cluster on the low-skilled employment rate becomes stronger. In addition, whether policies are 
                                                            
20 It is important to note that although the policy cluster*PES allocation and cycle*timing interactions are non-significant for the 
overall unemployment rate, they have been included in the specification given the results of the joint test of interaction 
coefficients in favour of their inclusion (i.e. interaction terms are jointly significant). In this circumstance, a misspecification 
would occur when considering a reduced version of the model without these interactions (Baum, 2006). 
21 See Appendix 3 for the graphic interpretation of the different interaction effects. 
22 In particular, as shown by Appendix 4, these control variables show significant results when used as explanatory variables 
of the two main policy variables policy cluster and start-up incentives.  
23 See Appendix 3 for the graphic interpretation of the different interaction effects.  
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implemented in a countercyclical or procyclical manner also influences the magnitude of the effect of the 
policy cluster on the employment rate of both population groups (i.e. interaction term between policy cluster 
and timing). The effect of this interaction term is also a mirror image of that of the unemployment rate 
but with the same implications. In other words, it has a negative significant effect on the employment 
rate of both population groups, implying that when policies are implemented in a countercyclical manner 
(timing=1), the employment enhancing effect of the policy cluster is lower. The interpretation of these 
effects remains the same as in the case of the unemployment rate. This effect is also confirmed by the 
cycle-timing interaction, which is significant only for the overall population. It suggests that when policies 
are implemented countercyclically, the elasticity of the employment rate to the cycle is lower.  
Labour force participation rate (LFPR) 
Active labour market policy intervention has also significant effects in the participation rate of the 
overall and low-skilled populations. Table 6 presents the parameter estimates for LFPR of the two 
population groups. The policy cluster variable is positively and significantly correlated with the labour force 
participation rates of both population groups, albeit only at the 10 per cent level for the low-skilled 
group.  
Implementation variables also have some level of significance. Policy continuity has a positive and 
significant effect on both labour force participation rates. Moreover, increasing the allocation of 
resources towards PES has a positive effect on the participation rates of both population groups but this 
effect is significantly different from zero only in the case of the overall participation rate.  
The interaction term between the policy cluster and the allocation of resources to PES is also significant in 
the case of the low-skilled participation rate and is positively correlated. As it was the case with the low-
skilled employment and unemployment rates, the analysis of this interaction’s parameter illustrates that 
as more ALMP resources are devoted to PES and administration, the favourable effect of the policy cluster 
on the low-skilled participation rate becomes stronger. Similarly, the cluster-timing interaction is significant 
only for the low skilled. In line with the low-skilled employment rate’s findings, it has a negative 
significant effect. The analysis of this interaction’s coefficient suggests that when policies are 
implemented in a countercyclical manner (timing=1), the participation enhancing effect of the policy 
cluster is lower. The interpretation of this effect remains the same as in the case of the employment and 
unemployment rates. As with the unemployment and employment rates, the effect of policies is 
enhanced when interactions are included in the analysis.  
It is important to note, that in the case of the LFPR of the overall population individual and joint tests 
for the non-significance of interactions terms could not be rejected so all interactions were dropped 
from the equation.  
Share of low-skilled unemployed individuals 
Active labour market policy intervention (as measured by the policy cluster variable) is also beneficial in 
reducing the negative “structuralization” of unemployment on weaker groups of the labour market, in 
this case the low-skilled. Table 7 presents the parameter estimates for the share of low-skilled 
unemployed individuals. Unlike the other models, only the policy cluster and the timing of the intervention 
show significant results, negative in both cases.  
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A note of caution is in order regarding the robustness of this last model since results did not always hold 
across the different estimations, mainly in the case of estimations that did not include country dummies. 
This might be explained by the fact that the structure of unemployment is particularly heterogeneous 
across countries. Country dummies were thus included in the OLS and GLS (AR1) estimations to 
account for the unexplained country-to-country variation. Adding country dummies, however, has the 
risk of saturating the model, as it can be seen by the size of variance in model (1). 
6.2 	Interpretation	of	results	
To give an idea of the size of the effects, I use the coefficients in the first columns of tables 4 to 7 
(which show effects of explicative variables before adding the interactions) as basis for some 
calculations. It can be observed that increasing an additional standard deviation in the policy cluster 
(US$4.8 thousand [PPP] per unemployed) would reduce the overall unemployment rate by around 2 
percentage points and the low-skilled unemployment rate by close to 3 percentage points. Importantly, 
the effect would be more important for the low-skilled since this increase in spending would be 
accompanied by a decrease of 1.5 percentage points in the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals 
(in total unemployment). In terms of employment, raising one standard deviation the expenditure on 
these policies would boost the overall employment rate by around 2.1 percentage points and the 
employment rate of the low-skilled by 2.7 percentage points. Finally, this would be associated as well 
with an increase in the labour force participation rates of the two groups by 1.6 and 1.7 percentage 
points, respectively. Importantly, in general, ALMP policies seem to be more effective in reducing the 
unemployment rate of the low skilled than the overall population. This, seems intuitively correct; first, 
because most policies are targeted towards this more disadvantaged group. Second, because higher-
skilled individuals are expected to be better equipped to find jobs by themselves and so policies targeted 
to them appear less effective due a potential deadweight loss. 
The effect of start-up incentives is also non negligible, albeit less significant in the case of the low-skilled. 
An increase by one standard deviation (US$140 [PPP] per unemployment) in expenditure allocated to 
start-up incentives would be accompanied by a 0.43 and 0.62 percentage points decrease in the 
unemployment rates of the overall and low-skilled populations, respectively. In terms of employment, 
this increase in spending would raise the employment rate of the overall population by 0.29 percentages 
points. 
In more detail, these results suggest that a country with a 10 per cent rate of unemployment (such as 
France or the United States in 2010) would need to spend around US$25,000 (PPP) in policy cluster-
type measures for every unemployed they want to reduce – i.e. reducing 0.4 for every 10 unemployed 
would cost US$10,000 (PPP) in a country with an unemployment rate of 10 per cent. Following the 
same logic, this same country would need to spend around US$3,300 (PPP) in start-up incentives for 
one fewer unemployed. Thus, start-up incentives are more effective in reducing unemployment than the 
policy cluster. Unfortunately, countries usually spend less on the latter, in part because it is commonly 
believed that these policies benefit more the higher skilled who also need less government assistance. 
Lower expenditure would mean that attaining efficient levels of expenditure in start-up incentives per 
unemployment individual would probably be harder. France, for example, would need to raise its 
expenditure per unemployed individual – relative to its 2010 expenditure – by over 270 and 565 per cent, 
respectively, in the cluster of policies and start-up incentives if the country is to attain the necessary 
levels for these policies to be the most efficient. This finding is in line with results from micro-
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econometric analyses, which show that start-up incentives are associated with a “double dividend” if 
subsidized businesses create additional jobs in the future (Caliendo and Künn, 2013).   
The story is different, however, for a country with 20 per cent unemployment rate such as Spain. In this 
case, the necessary expenditure in cluster policies to reduce by one the number of unemployed would be 
over US$50,000 (PPP), which is above the annual labour compensation per employee of US$40,044 
(PPP). In this case, start-up incentives also offer a “bigger bang for the buck” (around US$6,500 [PPP] 
for one fewer unemployed). Yet, this level of expenditure entails an increase of 1,650 per cent of Spain’s 
2010 expenditure in start-up incentives per unemployed individual, which seems unlikely. 
To put these numbers in perspective, the annual labour compensation per employee in France was much 
higher than these ALMP costs in 2010 totalling around US$47,500 (PPP) – e.g. it was US$42,890 (PPP) 
in average in the OECD. Spending in activation policies seems thus both economically and socially more 
efficient than having the government employ these people directly. Moreover, keeping these 
unemployed individuals attached to the benefit system has also costs for the government and for society 
as a whole. Specifically for France, in 2010 the cost for society24 of having one unemployed under the 
out-of-work maintenance and support income was around US$12,800 (PPP) per participant. In addition, 
the government spent over US$7,300 (PPP) per participant in 2010 in income support measures, 
principally for the unemployed that had exhausted their entitlement to unemployment benefits.25 
Importantly, the longer individuals are unemployed the less likely is that they find jobs without 
assistance. As such, activation measures will be likely needed to facilitate the return to work of these 
long-term unemployed individuals. 
Finally, as shown above, implementation also has an important effect. Before adding the different 
interactions, an increase by one percentage point in the share of PES (in total ALMP expenditure) would 
be associated with a decrease of 3.3 percentage points in the overall unemployment rate, and an increase 
by 4.2 and 3.5 percentage points in the overall employment and participation rates, respectively. 
Moreover, a disruption of policy continuity is associated with a reduction of 0.17 and 0.14 percentage 
points in the overall and low-skilled employment rates, respectively. Lack of continuity in the 
implementation of policies would also affect negatively the overall and low-skilled participation rates by 
0.11 and 0.16 percentage points, respectively. 
Interestingly, the size of effects arising from policy and implementation variables, once interactions are 
included is higher. This means that the interaction of the cluster of policies with the right 
implementation measures (e.g. namely right timing of policies and the share of PES spending) enhances 
their unemployment reducing effect.26 Moreover, some of the implementation variables become 
significant only once these interactions are in place. This is the case of policy continuity which would be 
associated with a decrease in the low-skilled unemployment rate of 0.16 percentage points. 
                                                            
24 This mainly includes the cost of the unemployment insurance system, but also the 50 per cent of the special employment 
assistance programme (AEPE) bared by the unemployment insurance system; and the 40 per cent specific solidarity 
allowance and pension equivalent allowance financed by the solidarity contributions of State employees (Author’s calculations 
based on Eurostat, 2013b). 
25 This includes the cost of the partial unemployment scheme (transferred to enterprises), the temporary delay allowance 
(ATA), the 50% of the special employment assistance (AEPE) bared by the Central government; and the 60% of specific 
solidarity and pension equivalent allowances financed by the State budget (Ibid). 
26 See Appendix 3 for the graphic interpretation of the different interaction effects. 
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Table 4. Regression results on the unemployment rate adding one interaction at a time 
 Unemployment rate Low-skilled unemployment rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cluster (Policy 1) -0.387*** -0.321*** -2.073*** -0.394*** -2.023*** -0.568*** -0.331** -3.130*** -0.584*** -2.968*** (0.0373) (0.0701) (0.239) (0.0372) (0.245) (0.0825) (0.165) (0.493) (0.0808) (0.515) 
Job rotation and job sharing 
(Policy 2) 
-0.736 -0.834 -0.830 -0.716 -0.905 0.245 -0.0957 0.00750 0.320 -0.231 
(0.576) (0.580) (0.558) (0.589) (0.554) (1.257) (1.225) (1.106) (1.241) (1.164) 
Start-up incentives (Policy 3) -3.065*** -3.137*** -2.158*** -2.998*** -2.320*** -4.423** -4.926*** -2.866* -5.257*** -3.856** (0.768) (0.767) (0.750) (0.782) (0.740) (1.802) (1.771) (1.652) (1.785) (1.725) 
Cluster * PES allocation   -0.323     -0.315   -1.015     -1.089* (0.291)   (0.278) (0.634)   (0.601) 
Cluster * Timing     1.707***   1.722***     2.617***   2.675*** (0.240)  (0.238) (0.494)  (0.494) 
PES allocation -3.298*** -2.897*** -4.564*** -3.451*** -4.096*** -2.005 -0.601 -3.865* -2.200 -2.633 (1.008) (1.063) (0.967) (1.005) (1.018) (2.228) (2.353) (2.096) (2.183) (2.251) 
Continuity in implementation 0.0102 0.0112 0.00602 0.000672 0.000143 0.0104 0.0210 0.0247 -0.192*** -0.155** (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0155) (0.0146) (0.0437) (0.0442) (0.0435) (0.0641) (0.0607) 
Correct timing of policies -1.432* -1.394* -3.110*** -1.166 -2.930*** -2.558* -2.500* -6.097*** 0.0230 -3.625** (0.828) (0.837) (0.770) (0.772) (0.810) (1.335) (1.370) (1.533) (1.428) (1.543) 
Cycle * Timing       -2.73e-06 -3.10e-06       -1.90e-05*** -1.79e-05***  (2.02e-06) (2.01e-06)  (4.54e-06) (4.37e-06) 
Growth rate of real GDP -0.0528** -0.0523** -0.0580** -0.0512* -0.0569** -0.0185 -0.0245 -0.0365 -0.0304 -0.0354 (0.0266) (0.0265) (0.0258) (0.0273) (0.0253) (0.0681) (0.0654) (0.0596) (0.0673) (0.0622) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
0.0125 0.0126 0.0211** 0.0155 0.0240** 0.0145 0.0156 0.0338 0.0398* 0.0592*** 
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0104) (0.0111) (0.0107) (0.0228) (0.0227) (0.0222) (0.0231) (0.0224) 
Union density 0.0431*** 0.0416*** 0.0245* 0.0345** 0.0212 0.0497* 0.0409 0.0342 0.0338 0.00771 (0.0152) (0.0154) (0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0262) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0256) (0.0259) 
EPL for temporary workers -0.117 -0.137 -0.0755 -0.0957 -0.101 -1.277*** -1.242*** -1.095*** -1.186*** -1.079*** (0.171) (0.172) (0.159) (0.167) (0.161) (0.334) (0.334) (0.325) (0.326) (0.313) 
EU 3.404*** 3.433*** 3.821*** 3.319*** 3.620*** 6.293*** 6.339*** 6.716*** 6.124*** 6.752*** 
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(0.755) (0.764) (0.665) (0.704) (0.709) (1.164) (1.200) (1.234) (1.125) (1.117) 
Constant 7.357*** 7.313*** 9.041*** 7.385*** 8.991*** 13.24*** 13.09*** 15.78*** 8.788*** 11.64*** (1.255) (1.262) (1.163) (1.196) (1.189) (2.340) (2.362) (2.385) (2.511) (2.459) 
Observations 452 452 452 452 452 336 336 336 336 336 
Number of countries27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent. All models have been 
estimated by FGLS with AR1 correction (preferred specification). 
 
Table 5. Regression results on the employment rate adding one interaction at a time 
 Employment rate Low-skilled employment rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cluster (Policy 1) 0.436*** 0.390*** 1.396*** 0.463*** 1.167*** 0.563*** 0.190 1.701*** 0.685*** 1.850*** (0.0527) (0.100) (0.314) (0.0529) (0.346) (0.110) (0.199) (0.644) (0.118) (0.712) 
Job rotation and job sharing 
(Policy 2) 
-0.883 -0.826 -0.773 -1.056 -0.832 -1.264 -0.696 -0.999 -1.926 -0.908 
(0.711) (0.725) (0.682) (0.745) (0.724) (1.389) (1.392) (1.300) (1.609) (1.497) 
Start-up incentives (Policy 3) 2.085** 2.198** 1.559* 2.282** 1.898** 1.146 1.762 0.558 1.929 1.577 (0.947) (0.963) (0.923) (0.975) (0.967) (1.891) (1.889) (1.800) (2.134) (2.030) 
Cluster * PES allocation   0.220     0.297   1.672**     1.826** (0.381)   (0.378) (0.754)   (0.799) 
Cluster * Timing     -0.979***   -0.791**     -1.189*   -1.638** (0.311)  (0.330) (0.638)  (0.682) 
PES allocation 4.153*** 3.911*** 4.658*** 4.043*** 4.120*** 3.103 0.870 3.745 4.182 2.443 (1.232) (1.328) (1.215) (1.256) (1.351) (2.673) (2.822) (2.591) (2.944) (3.012) 
Continuity in implementation 0.172*** 0.174*** 0.159*** 0.213*** 0.191*** 0.135** 0.125** 0.121* 0.236*** 0.183** (0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0377) (0.0392) (0.0385) (0.0629) (0.0626) (0.0627) (0.0874) (0.0828) 
Correct timing of policies -2.901*** -2.989*** -1.448 -5.943*** -4.247*** -4.550** -4.743** -2.591 -6.666*** -4.052* 
                                                            
27 Israel has been dropped from all regressions due to total unavailability of information about union density. Estonia and Luxembourg were dropped from GLS (AR1) regressions 
because not enough information on EPL for temporary workers was available to carry out the analysis. The same occurred with Slovenia but with two variables, union density and 
EPL for temporary workers. This is relevant for all equations presented in tables 5, 6, 7 and 8.  
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(0.943) (0.942) (1.022) (1.061) (1.240) (2.074) (2.075) (2.328) (2.074) (2.277) 
Cycle * Timing       0.00109*** 0.000891***       7.53e-06 5.26e-06 
 (0.000251) (0.000267)  (6.25e-06) (6.15e-06) 
Cycle 6.30e-06** 6.52e-06** 5.51e-06** -0.00108*** -0.00088***      (2.80e-06) (2.81e-06) (2.77e-06) (0.000251) (0.000268)      
Growth rate of real GDP -0.0265 -0.0273 -0.0204 -0.0355 -0.0283 0.0699 0.0684 0.0813 0.0450 0.0587 (0.0377) (0.0380) (0.0361) (0.0397) (0.0380) (0.0747) (0.0737) (0.0697) (0.0873) (0.0796) 
Unemployment rate of the 
high skilled 
-0.773*** -0.771*** -0.712*** -0.832*** -0.768*** -0.585*** -0.563*** -0.523*** -0.540*** -0.433** 
(0.0797) (0.0801) (0.0797) (0.0816) (0.0825) (0.170) (0.169) (0.170) (0.185) (0.182) 
Union density 0.0622*** 0.0647*** 0.0642*** 0.0692*** 0.0730*** 0.0872** 0.100** 0.0907** 0.0945** 0.117*** (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0161) (0.0168) (0.0408) (0.0411) (0.0425) (0.0379) (0.0395) 
EPL for temporary workers -0.655*** -0.655*** -0.677*** -0.453** -0.516** 2.151*** 2.149*** 1.880*** 2.639*** 2.381*** (0.203) (0.203) (0.200) (0.206) (0.206) (0.445) (0.442) (0.438) (0.457) (0.445) 
EU -8.606*** -8.651*** -8.712*** -10.08*** -9.932*** -9.361*** -9.570*** -9.365*** -9.761*** -10.10*** (0.763) (0.760) (0.773) (0.764) (0.783) (1.870) (1.872) (1.995) (1.673) (1.744) 
Constant 76.90*** 76.96*** 75.15*** 80.71*** 78.57*** 51.43*** 51.60*** 49.64*** 52.11*** 49.36*** (1.422) (1.421) (1.495) (1.594) (1.783) (3.163) (3.149) (3.387) (3.216) (3.354) 
Observations 364 364 364 364 364 352 352 352 352 352 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent. All models have been 
estimated by FGLS with AR1 correction (preferred specification). 
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Table 6. Regression results on the participation rate adding one interaction at a time 
 
Participation 
rate Low-skilled participation rate 
 (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cluster (Policy 1) 0.340*** 0.346*** -0.00243 1.569** 1.360* (0.0535) (0.105) (0.192) (0.666) (0.695) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
-1.481* -0.571 -0.0946 -0.559 -0.0841 
(0.786) (1.319) (1.360) (1.348) (1.404) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
0.587 -0.0873 0.729 -0.576 0.223 
(1.126) (1.998) (2.050) (2.056) (2.130) 
Cluster * PES allocation   1.681**   1.736** 
(0.736)  (0.755) 
Cluster * Timing     -1.202* -1.345** (0.657) (0.665) 
PES allocation 3.540** 1.171 -0.773 2.321 0.550 (1.377) (2.570) (2.757) (2.657) (2.867) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
0.112*** 0.157*** 0.152** 0.160*** 0.155** 
(0.0265) (0.0610) (0.0607) (0.0608) (0.0606) 
Correct timing of 
policies 
-3.748*** -4.362** -4.750** -2.979 -3.246 
(0.794) (2.091) (2.044) (2.219) (2.172) 
Growth rate of real 
GDP 
-0.0705* 0.0438 0.0380 0.0416 0.0341 
(0.0428) (0.0725) (0.0738) (0.0741) (0.0762) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
0.0494*** -0.0472 -0.0475 -0.0554* -0.0572* 
(0.0139) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0302) (0.0304) 
Unemployment rate of 
the high skilled 
-0.201** -0.0954 -0.0517 0.0135 0.0714 
(0.0840) (0.167) (0.169) (0.178) (0.180) 
Union density 0.0999*** 0.127*** 0.140*** 0.133*** 0.148*** (0.0156) (0.0402) (0.0398) (0.0396) (0.0390) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
-0.873*** 1.383*** 1.465*** 1.417*** 1.525*** 
(0.204) (0.435) (0.435) (0.437) (0.437) 
EU -7.094*** -7.905*** -8.230*** -8.390*** -8.806*** (0.691) (1.874) (1.830) (1.840) (1.784) 
Constant 76.04*** 58.87*** 58.91*** 57.23*** 57.05*** (1.461) (3.436) (3.397) (3.510) (3.470) 
Observations 336 326 326 326 326 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; 
***significant at 1 per cent. All models have been estimated by FGLS with AR1 correction (preferred specification). 
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Table 7. Regression results on the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals adding one interaction at 
a time 
 Share of low skilled unemployed individuals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cluster (Policy 1) -0.315** -0.723** -1.574* -1.995** (0.157) (0.296) (0.924) (0.955) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
1.967 2.486 1.781 2.287 
(2.006) (2.026) (1.988) (2.008) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
-2.711 -1.121 -1.409 0.175 
(3.513) (3.656) (3.594) (3.734) 
Cluster * PES allocation   1.861   1.816 (1.161)  (1.153) 
Cluster * Timing     1.261 1.284 (0.907) (0.903) 
PES allocation 2.574 0.190 1.739 -0.586 (4.302) (4.574) (4.288) (4.553) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
-0.153 -0.140 -0.150 -0.137 
(0.133) (0.133) (0.131) (0.132) 
Correct timing of 
policies 
-12.50** -13.69** -14.98** -16.20** 
(6.159) (6.184) (6.367) (6.392) 
Growth rate of real 
GDP 
0.185 0.186 0.188 0.189 
(0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.118) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
-0.00653 -0.0117 0.00846 0.00387 
(0.0414) (0.0413) (0.0426) (0.0425) 
Unemployment rate of 
the high skilled 
-0.651*** -0.609*** -0.795*** -0.756*** 
(0.232) (0.233) (0.255) (0.256) 
Union density 0.154 0.169* 0.170* 0.185* (0.0971) (0.0971) (0.0976) (0.0976) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
1.630** 1.705** 1.581** 1.652** 
(0.785) (0.784) (0.780) (0.779) 
EU -26.76*** -26.91*** -27.90*** -28.07*** (5.949) (5.917) (5.991) (5.960) 
Constant 58.00*** 59.20*** 59.78*** 60.95*** (6.389) (6.417) (6.469) (6.493) 
Observations 306 306 306 306 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; 
***significant at 1 per cent. All models have been estimated by FGLS with AR1 correction (preferred specification) run 
with country dummies. 
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6.3 	Sensitivity	analysis	
This section discusses the robustness checks that have been carried out to evaluate the sensitivity of the 
parameters presented in tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, based on a number of alternative specifications and tests 
reported in appendices 5 and 6.  
The use of different samples – i.e. overall population and low-skilled – in each labour market equation, 
as discussed in the previous section, can be considered as the first robustness check. Results hold and 
seem to be coherent between the two population groups analysed. Moreover, robustness of results was 
checked by excluding key countries (in terms of the relative size of their ALMP expenditure), namely 
Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden, and by running the regressions on EU countries only. With some 
exceptions, changing the sample does not seem to alter the big lines of the estimation results (see 
Appendix 5). The window of time was also modified to see whether results held when studying only the 
last decade. Overall results seem to hold, with two exceptions: first the policy cluster reveals a loss of 
significance in affecting the share of low-skilled unemployed. Second, the allocation of resources to PES 
and the timing of policies no longer affect directly the unemployment rate but through the interaction 
with the policy cluster.  
Reduced estimations were also carried out, although results are not provided in this paper. In particular, 
I estimated three reduced models for each dependent variable: the first model estimates only the 
influence of the three policy interventions; the second model tests only implementation variables; and 
the third model presents the results of the full model. In the description of results, the concentration was 
on the estimations of the full model only. 
Along with these additional specifications carried out, a number of tests were included in the different 
specifications. First, the dependent variables were controlled for non-stationarity through the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test. In all cases (but one) the tests rejected the null hypotheses of non-stationarity at 1 
and 5 per cent levels. The exception was the variable share of low-skilled unemployed individuals which seems 
to be non-stationary. Moreover, the different models were controlled for heteroskedasticity using the 
robust option available. Robust results did not look very different from non-robust results.  
The problems of serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and endogeneity have been taken especially 
seriously and have been dealt with through a number of tests and estimation techniques. First of all, the 
Lagram-Multiplier test (Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker, 2003) and the abar post-estimation technique 
(Roodman, 2006) were used to test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error terms. Given that the 
results of these tests confirmed the presence of first order autocorrelation, all specifications were run 
with a FGLS estimator, which allows the assessment in the presence of AR(1) autocorrelation within 
panels, cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels.  
Moreover, to address the reverse causality problem, a final estimation was carried out, instrumenting (i.e. 
finding variables correlated with the endogenous variables, but not correlated with error term) for the 
policy cluster and job rotation and job sharing variables and for the implementation-related variables continuity 
and timing through a 2 stages least squares (2SLS) estimator.28 In addition to the other exogenous 
                                                            
28 The variable start-up incentives was not considered endogenous because the results of the C test of exogeneity did not favour 
its inclusion among the endogenous group. Indeed, when the orthogonality conditions of the model including this variable as 
exogenous were tested, the C test indicated robust results.  
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variables of the model, I used two sets of instruments in the analysis. The first one is a set of 
macroeconomic and structural variables including fiscal deficit or public debt depending on the 
specification,29 inflation, the share of the population with tertiary education and total expenditure in passive labour 
market policies. Moreover, the differenced unemployment rate was included in the models explaining the 
employment rate and the two labour force participation rates and the variable terms of trade in the models 
explaining the unemployment rate, low-skilled employment rate and labour force participation rate. The 
second is a set of governability-related indicators. This set includes two indicators of the colour of the 
party;30 a dummy variable, reform, taking the value of 1 if a reform to active labour market policies was 
put in place in that year in the country and 0 otherwise;31 and a continuous variable, durable, illustrating 
the number of years that have passed since a change in governability was implemented in the country 
(Marshal et al., 2013). Reform was excluded from the models explaining the employment rate, labour 
force participation rate and low-skilled labour force participation rate because its addition proved to be 
redundant. Durable was also excluded from the two labour force participation rate equations for the same 
reason. 
Results are presented in Appendix 6 and broadly confirm the findings discussed in previous sections. 
Accounting for the endogeneity of policy and implementation variables leads to the same effect of the 
policy cluster and start-up incentives. In fact, start-up incentives become significant in boosting the low-skilled 
participation rate and in reducing the share of low-skilled unemployment. A difference in the results 
however, is that job rotation and job sharing becomes significant in most of the equations (with the 
exception of the overall employment rate and the low-skilled participation rate) but in an ambivalent 
manner. An increase in spending in this policy appears to be detrimental for the unemployment and 
employment rates, but positive in boosting overall participation and in reducing the share of low-skilled 
unemployment. This seems intuitive given the aim of these policies, i.e. promoting a full or partial 
substitution of an employee by an unemployed person or a person from another target group. The 
allocation of resources towards PES also gains significance in the specifications related to the low-skilled 
when instruments are added. The same occurs with the variable continuity in implementation, with 
exception of the low-skilled employment and overall participation rates. Finally, the variable timing 
continues to the significant and negatively related with the different employment and participation rates. 
A change occurs however in the sign of this variable’s effect on the unemployment rate equations. When 
instruments are included, the coefficient of timing in these two equations becomes positive, implying 
that when policies are implemented in a countercyclical manner they would have an unemployment 
increasing effect. This represents now the mirror image of the employment and participation rates 
equations. The interpretation of these results would be the same explained above. True, policies that are 
implemented countercyclically may have stronger unfavourable effects during booms (when pro-cyclical 
policies should be implemented) but also stronger favourable effects during crises. This confirms the 
argument in favour of policy continuity. 
                                                            
29 To avoid correlation of the instrument with the error term, fiscal deficit was used in the unemployment rate and share of 
low-skilled unemployed equations and public debt in the remaining equations. 
30 Cabinet composition 1, illustrates the percentage of right-wing or left-wing parties (the variable with the lowest correlation with 
the dependant variable was chosen for each model) in total cabinet posts, weighted by days (Armigeon et al., 2013a; 2007). 
Cabinet composition 2 corresponds to the Schmidt-Index, which takes a value of 1 to 5 depending on whether there is a 
dominance of right-wing or left-wing parties in the composition of cabinets (Armigeon et al., 2013b).  
31 fRDB-IZA Reforms Database (Anelli et al., no available). 
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All 2SLS models were estimated using the gmm and robust options to compute efficient estimates in 
presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The exception was the estimation of the share of low-
skilled unemployed where the robust option was not used. The models showed robust results in the test for 
the validity of instruments in an overidentified context (J statistic of Hansen to test for overidentifying 
restrictions) implying that the group of instruments used is suitable and that it satisfies the required 
orthogonality conditions. To test whether there are sufficient valid instruments to identify the model (i.e. 
models are not underindentified) and whether models are not relying on weak instruments, the 
Anderson’s canonical correlations approach was used. The null hypothesis was rejected in all models 
implying that there are enough adequate instruments to estimate the equations. This was confirmed as 
well by Shea’s partial R2 (Baum, 2006). 
Finally, an analysis of the variance was carried out in each of the 7 models to assess the percentage of the 
variability of the result that was explained by explanatory variables and how much of that variability was 
left unexplained. In the case of the overall unemployment rate, the R-squared showed that 84.1 per cent 
of the variance was explained by independent variables, while it was 90 per cent in the case of the low-
skilled unemployment rate. Although high, these are still within the rule of thumb of 90 per cent that is 
acceptable. The variance analysis for the employment and participation rates showed as well shares of 
the variance within the limits acceptable. These figures were 74.6 per cent and 49.9 per cent for the 
employment rates of the overall and low-skilled populations, respectively; and 62.2 per cent and 48 per 
cent the participation rates of the overall and low-skilled populations, respectively. In contrast, the 
segment of the variance explained by the explanatory variables in the estimation of the share of low-
skilled unemployed individuals was 92.8 per cent. This shows that the use of country dummies to 
control for country-specific characteristics might be saturating the model in this last case.    
These additional analyses broadly confirm the estimation results discussed above. Indeed, results remain 
largely robust across various specifications, including pooled OLS, OLS models with robust standard 
errors, random-effects and fixed-effects models depending on the results of the Hausman test (not 
reported here), models with country dummies, FGLS estimator to account for serial correlation, as well 
as the instrumental variable estimator 2SLS. Importantly, the results concerning the effect of ALMP in 
shaping the “structuralization” of unemployment on the low-skilled remained more sensitive. 
Robustness checks show that results not always hold across the different estimations, mainly in the case 
of estimations that did not include country dummies. This might be explained by the fact that the 
structure of unemployment is particularly country specific. 
7. Conclusion	
This paper examines the effectiveness of active labour market policies (ALMP) in improving labour 
market outcomes, especially that of low-skilled individuals, in bringing them back to employment and 
sustainably integrating them to the labour market. Much has been written about effectiveness of 
activation measures based on evaluations carried out using micro-data, yet very little about their 
effectiveness at the aggregate level. This paper aims to contribute to filling this gap in the literature 
through an aggregate impact approach which is better placed to measure both, the direct and indirect 
effects of ALMP. This will be done by ways of a pooled cross-country and time-series database for 31 
advanced countries during the period 1985–2010. Different models were estimated to measure the effect 
of six different ALMP and three dimensions of implementation (i.e. allocation of resources to public 
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administration, continuity and timing in the implementation of programmes) on the unemployment, 
employment and participation rates of the overall and low-skilled populations and the share of low-
skilled unemployed individuals. Controls for demand conditions, the structure of the labour market and 
differences in institutional arrangements were included as well. For each specification, different 
estimators were used to control for cross-country heterogeneity, account for serial correlation and 
address the specification problem caused by reverse causality.  
In sum, I find that ALMP matters at the aggregate level. Public expenditure in training, employment 
incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation and direct job creation measures (i.e. the policy 
cluster) show the most favourable results. In particular, policy cluster has a significant unemployment 
reducing effect and a significant employment and labour participation expanding effect for the overall 
and low-skilled populations – albeit a low significance on the participation rate of the low skilled (Table 
8). In addition, results suggest that expenditure in these policies has the potential of reducing the share 
of low-skilled unemployed. Spending in start-up incentives is effective as well but only in reducing the 
unemployment rate of both population groups and in boosting the employment rate of the overall 
population. Results on the rest of labour market variables studied are non-significant. Likewise, the 
effect of job rotation and job sharing measures is non-significant in all estimations carried out. 
In terms of implementation, results show that the most favourable aspect is the allocation of resources 
to programme administration. Indeed, while the allocation of resources to PES has a direct and 
favourable impact on labour market variables of the overall population; it affects labour variables of the 
low-skilled through an interaction with the policy cluster. In other words, increasing the allocation of 
resources towards PES would have a reducing effect in the case of the overall unemployment rate and 
an expanding effect in the case of the overall employment and participation rates. The direct effect of 
this variable on the labour market outcomes of the low-skilled, however, is non-significant. Meanwhile, 
the interaction term between the policy cluster and the allocation of resources to PES is significant in the 
case of the low-skilled. This effect illustrates that as more ALMP resources are devoted to PES and 
administration, the favourable effect of the policy cluster on the low-skilled unemployment, employment 
and participation rates becomes stronger.  
Second, a disruption of policy continuity would be associated with negative effects for all labour market 
variables analysed. The effect of policy continuity is significant negative in the case of the low-skilled 
unemployment rate and significant positive in the case of the employment and participation rates of 
both population groups. No significance was found, however, in the effect of this variable on the overall 
unemployment rate and the share of the unemployed low-skilled. 
Finally, the variable timing, which measures whether policies are implemented in a countercyclical 
manner revealed a significant and negative relationship with all labour market variables analysed but the 
participation rate of the low-skilled. These results suggest that countercyclical policies (timing=1) have an 
unemployment reducing effect32 but also an employment and participation reducing effect. Although this 
might seem surprising, this effect cannot be analysed in isolation. The interaction of timing with the policy 
cluster is also significant for some of the variables and has a positive effect on the unemployment rate of 
                                                            
32 When instruments are included in the analysis to address the endogeneity problem, these two relationships become positive 
(and are the only ones that result in a change in sign due to the instrumenting) suggesting an unemployment increasing effect 
of countercyclical policies.  
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both population groups and negative effect employment rate of both population groups and the 
participation rate of the low-skilled. The complete picture would suggest that policies that are 
implemented pro-cyclically have stronger favourable effects during booms but also stronger 
unfavourable effects during crises, confirming the argument in favour of policy continuity. Policy 
continuity is also supported by the cycle-timing interaction in the two variables where effects were 
significant: the low-skilled unemployment rate and the overall population employment rate. In these two 
cases, the interaction shows that when policies are implemented countercyclically, the elasticities of the 
unemployment and employment rates to the cycle are lower. Interestingly, the size of the coefficients 
arising from policy and implementation variables, once interactions are included is noticeably higher. 
This demonstrates that a correct implementation of policies enhances their beneficial effect. 
Table 8. Synopsis of regression results 
 UNR  
UNR 
LSK  EMP RATE 
EMP 
RATE 
LSK 
LFPR LFPR LSK 
Share of 
LSK UN 
Policy Cluster  (-)*** (-)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)* (-)** 
Job rotation and job sharing  NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Start-up incentives (-)*** (-)** (+)** NS NS NS NS 
Cluster * PES allocation NS (-)* NS (+)**  (+)** NS 
Cluster * Timing (+)*** (+)*** (-)** (-)**  (-)** NS 
PES allocation (-)*** NS (+)*** NS (+)** NS NS 
Continuity in implementation NS (-)** (+)*** (+)** (+)*** (+)** NS 
Correct timing of policies (-)*** (-)** (-)*** (-)* (-)*** NS (-)** 
Cycle * Timing NS (-)*** (+)*** NS    
Cycle    (-)***     
Growth rate of real GDP (-)** NS NS NS (-)* NS NS 
EU (+)*** (+)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
Constant (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
Observations 452 336 364 352 336 326 306 
Table  5 5 6 6 7 7 8 
Column 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 
Notes: Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent.  
UNR= unemployment rate; LSK= low-skilled; EMP RATE= employment rate; LFPR= labour force participation rate; 
UN= unemployed; and NS means non-significant.  
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Appendix	1:	Expected	effects	of	specific	ALMP	on	the	labour	market	
Measure Type of ALMP 
Expected to 
affect: Channel Actual effect: 
Effect in 
the: Transmission mechanism 
Effect on the 
labour market 
Create jobs for 
specific groups - Direct-job creation 
Matching 
process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Reduced search 
effectiveness 
(unintended 
effect) 
Short-term 
Participants may reduce their search efforts in 
the knowledge that the employment services 
will find work for them (Bellman and 
Jackman 1996b). 
Reduced 
employment 
Create jobs for 
specific groups - Direct-job creation Job creation 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
(workers 
subsidies). 
Labour demand 
(hiring credits). 
Job creation 
(intended effect) 
Short-term 
(effects on 
the labour 
market on 
the medium-
term)  
Wage subsidies reduce workers’ wage 
expectations increasing labour supply at any 
given market wage and reducing 
unemployment (Ohlsson, 1995). Hiring 
credits, on the other hand, reduce the effective 
wage paid by employers shifting labour 
demand upwards (Neumark, 2011).   
Increased 
employment and 
effective wages. 
No inflation of real 
wages in the long 
term. 
Create jobs for 
specific groups 
- Direct-job creation 
- Employment 
incentives and other 
subsidised 
employment 
policies. 
Deadweight 
loss Labour demand 
Deadweight loss 
(unintended 
effect) 
Short- to 
medium-
term 
Reduced efficiency of programmes since 
hiring from the target group would have 
occurred even in the absence of the 
programme (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995; 
Martin and Grubb, 2001; García-Pérez et al., 
2009; Cebrián et al., 2011). 
Deadweight loss 
lowers efficiency of 
programmes if not 
properly targeted 
Improve skills 
and 
competencies 
- Training 
- Supported 
employment and 
rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) 
Matching 
process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Improved search 
effectiveness 
(intended effect) 
Short-term 
Participants in training courses provide a 
positive signal to potential employers, 
reducing uncertainty about the employability 
of job applicants (Bellman and Jackman 
1996b; Layard and Nickell, 1986; OECD, 
1993). 
Reduced 
unemployment 
Improve skills 
and 
competencies 
- Training Matching process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Reduced search 
effectiveness 
(unintended 
effect) 
Short-term 
Participants may reduce their search efforts 
because of a potentially attractive course or in 
the expectation that the course culminates (i.e. 
lock-in effect) (Bellman and Jackman 1996b; 
Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). 
Reduced 
employment 
Improve skills 
and 
competencies 
- Training 
- Supported 
employment and 
Matching 
process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Facilitated 
matching 
(intended effect) 
Long-term 
Training would adjust the qualifications of 
jobseekers to the structure of demand (OECD, 
1993) and reduce “structuralization” (Schmid 
Lower 
unemployment at 
least among 
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rehabilitation (where 
there is provision of 
vocational training) 
et al. 2001). Specifically for the low-skilled, it 
would increase cross-sector mobility by 
qualifying them for work in sectors where the 
demand for labour is growing (Bellman and 
Jackman 1996a). 
targeted groups. 
Improve skills 
and 
competencies 
- Training 
- To certain degree 
supported 
employment and 
rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) and 
direct-job creation 
measures with on-
the-job training 
components. 
Productivity Labour demand 
Increased 
productivity 
(intended effect) 
Long-term 
Increases in productivity can have 
externalities that contribute to general 
productivity increases (OECD, 1993) and to 
general technical progress of societies 
(Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995).  
Reduced 
unemployment 
Improve skills 
and 
competencies 
- Training 
- To certain degree 
supported 
employment and 
rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) and 
direct-job creation 
measures with on-
the-job training 
components. 
Productivity Labour demand 
Substitution effect
(unintended 
effect) 
Long-term 
Importantly, the labour demand can be 
reduced if this scale effect of labour 
productivity outweighs the substitution effect 
arising because a given output can be 
produced by fewer, more efficient workers 
(usually when the labour demand is elastic) 
(Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). 
Increase in 
employment and 
wages if scale effect 
offsets substitution 
effect. 
Prevent 
inactivity and 
skill erosion 
- Training 
- To some extent, 
subsidised 
employment 
policies. 
Labour supply Wage-setting schedule 
Increased search 
effectiveness 
(intended effect) 
Short-term 
Maintain the unemployed active and available 
during recessions, which would reduce the 
number of vacancies and lower the wage 
pressure (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995; 
OECD, 1993). 
Positive effect on 
the effective supply 
of labour. 
Provide 
assistance with 
job search 
- PES 
- To some extent, 
employment 
incentives 
Competition 
for insiders 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Increased 
competition 
(intended effect) 
Short-term 
Downward pressure on wages due to 
increased competition for vacancies (Bellman 
and Jackman 1996b; OECD, 1993; Layard et 
al. 1991; Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). 
Lower wages and 
lower 
unemployment. 
Provide 
assistance with 
job search 
- PES 
- Training 
Matching 
process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Improved search 
effectiveness 
(intended effect) 
Short- to 
medium-
term 
Placement services can improve the 
effectiveness of search (Bellman and Jackman 
1996b, OECD, 1993). Some believe, however, 
Reduced 
unemployment and 
reduced vacancies. 
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that this positive effect depends on quality of 
implementation (de Koning, 1993). 
Provide 
assistance with 
job search 
- PES Matching process 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Reduced search 
effectiveness 
(unintended 
effect) 
Short-term 
Assistance with job search might raise wage 
pressure by reducing the fear of 
unemployment (Bellman and Jackman, 1996a; 
Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995).  
Reduced 
employment 
Provide 
assistance with 
job search 
- PES 
- To some extent, 
direct-job creation 
Matching 
process Labour demand 
Improved search 
effectiveness 
(intended effect) 
Medium- to 
long-term 
Assistance with job search might also increase 
the number of vacancies because opening 
posts becomes less costly for firms 
(Pissarides, 1990; Calmfors and Lang, 1995; 
OECD, 1993; Davia et al. 2001). 
Increased labour 
demand and 
reduced 
unemployment. 
Targeted 
policies to 
specific groups 
- Job rotation and 
job sharing 
- Supported 
employment and 
rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) 
Competition 
for insiders 
and outsiders 
Wage-setting 
schedule 
Increased 
competition 
(intended effect) 
Short-term 
Programmes targeting specific groups can also 
create more competition for vacancies, 
creating downward pressure on wages 
(Bellman and Jackman 1996b). 
Lower wages and 
lower 
unemployment. But 
also increased 
welfare for the 
vulnerable groups 
targeted. 
Targeted 
policies to 
specific groups 
- Job rotation and 
job sharing 
- Supported 
employment and 
rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) 
- Direct-job creation 
Competition 
for insiders 
and outsiders 
Labour demand 
Substitution effect
(unintended or 
intended effect) 
Short-term 
Substitution effect occurs when jobs created 
for a certain category of workers replace jobs 
for other categories (OECD, 1993; Calmfors 
and Skedinger, 1995; de Koning and Arents, 
2001; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Dauth et al. 
2010). 
Reduced labour 
demand for regular 
employment. Total 
effect on 
employment would 
depend on the scale 
of the substitution 
effect. 
Targeted 
policies to 
specific groups 
- Job rotation and 
job sharing 
- Supported 
employment and 
rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) 
Labour supply Wage-setting schedule 
Reduced search 
effectiveness 
(unintended 
effect) 
Short-term 
Targeted policies to specific groups (e.g. 
youth, long-term unemployed, low-skilled) 
could mitigate the fear of unemployment 
among the targeted individuals and thus, 
reduce the incentives to search for jobs 
(OECD, 1995).33  
Reduced 
employment 
Targeted - Job rotation and Matching Wage-setting Increased search Short-term Many authors believe that state dependence is Lower wages and 
                                                            
33 The above, however, would imply that individuals are myopic in terms of the actual risks they face of unemployment. If this were true, myopic individuals would compare 
themselves with the rest of the population rather than with their vulnerable group. This will give them a sense of an increased competition, which will reduce their wage bargain 
(Bellman and Jackman 1996a). 
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policies to 
specific groups 
job sharing 
- Supported 
employment and 
rehabilitation 
(subsidisation) 
process and 
competition 
effects for 
insiders and 
outsiders 
schedule effectiveness 
(intended effect) 
(effects on 
the labour 
market on 
the medium-
term) 
not a sufficient explanation (Calmfors and 
Lang, 1995; Huger et al. 2009) and that the 
assumption of myopia is overrated (Gergory, 
1986). In general, ALMP that target 
disadvantaged groups (especially when used 
in conjunction with benefit conditionality) will 
put pressure on unemployed people to search 
harder for jobs, which will be associated with 
lower wage pressure and more jobs (Bellman 
and Jackman 1996a).  
lower 
unemployment. 
Targeted 
policies to the 
self-employed 
- Start-up incentives Job creation Labour demand Job creation Short-term 
Measures to promote entrepreneurship are 
expected to enhance the number of 
entrepreneurs with the explicit view to 
contribute to job creation (European 
Commission, 2003). 
Reduced 
unemployment. But 
also increased 
welfare for the 
vulnerable groups 
targeted. 
Targeted 
policies to the 
self-employed 
- Start-up incentives Competition for insiders Labour demand 
Displacement 
effect 
(unintended 
effect) 
Long-term 
Increased competition could imply that the 
businesses set up by the beneficiaries of start-
up incentives drive other existing 
(unsubsidised) businesses out of the market 
(Román et al., 2013). 
Reduced 
unemployment and 
increased 
employment if new 
self-employed do 
not displace 
unsubsidised 
entrepreneurs. 
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Appendix	2:	Regression	results	based	on	three	different	estimation	techniques		
Table A1.1. Regression results on the unemployment rate 
 Unemployment rate Low-skilled unemployment rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Cluster (Policy 1) -2.469*** -2.435*** -2.023*** -2.843*** -2.797*** -2.968*** (0.230) (0.227) (0.245) (0.483) (0.470) (0.515) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
-1.377* -1.386* -0.905 -1.795 -1.841 -0.231 
(0.768) (0.764) (0.554) (1.415) (1.391) (1.164) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
-5.729*** -5.589*** -2.320*** -4.010** -4.268** -3.856** 
(0.934) (0.925) (0.740) (1.877) (1.835) (1.725) 
Cluster * PES allocation -0.694** -0.650** -0.315 0.00688 -0.175 -1.089* (0.294) (0.288) (0.278) (0.679) (0.658) (0.601) 
Cluster * Timing 2.198*** 2.152*** 1.722*** 2.153*** 2.147*** 2.675*** (0.224) (0.222) (0.238) (0.458) (0.446) (0.494) 
PES allocation -6.935*** -6.993*** -4.096*** -3.137 -2.995 -2.633 (1.182) (1.123) (1.018) (3.148) (2.989) (2.251) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
0.0258* 0.0256* 0.000143 0.257*** 0.138** -0.155** 
(0.0147) (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0916) (0.0676) (0.0607) 
Correct timing of 
policies 
-4.544*** -2.930*** -6.967** -3.625** 
(1.454) (0.810) (3.331) (1.543) 
Cycle * Timing -7.52e-06 -2.61e-06 -3.10e-06 -3.89e-06 -2.25e-06 -1.79e-05*** (5.87e-06) (3.22e-06) (2.01e-06) (9.94e-06) (6.67e-06) (4.37e-06) 
Growth rate of real 
GDP 
-0.107** -0.105** -0.0569** 0.0594 0.0727 -0.0354 
(0.0453) (0.0447) (0.0253) (0.0903) (0.0883) (0.0622) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
0.0366*** 0.0315*** 0.0240** 0.0154 0.0123 0.0592*** 
(0.00950) (0.00885) (0.0107) (0.0250) (0.0219) (0.0224) 
Union density 0.0962*** 0.0759*** 0.0212 0.0844 0.0604 0.00771 (0.0211) (0.0180) (0.0145) (0.0588) (0.0449) (0.0259) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
-0.518** -0.487*** -0.101 -1.439*** -1.479*** -1.079*** 
(0.200) (0.185) (0.161) (0.483) (0.436) (0.313) 
EU 3.013** 3.620*** 6.180** 6.752*** (1.372) (0.709) (3.071) (1.117) 
Constant 9.089*** 11.01*** 8.991*** 19.47*** 19.96*** 11.64*** (1.364) (1.906) (1.189) (3.522) (4.398) (2.459) 
Observations 455 455 452 339 339 336 
R-squared 0.841 0.900 
Number of countries34   30 27   30 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; 
***significant at 1 per cent. (1) Pooled ordinary least squares model (OLS); (2) GLS (either fixed- or random-effects); 
and (3) FGLS with AR1 correction. OLS estimates include country dummies. 
                                                            
34 Israel has been dropped from all regressions due to total unavailability of information about union density. Estonia and 
Luxembourg were dropped from GLS (AR1) regressions because not enough information on EPL for temporary workers 
was available to carry out the analysis. The same occurred with Slovenia but with two variables, union density and EPL for 
temporary workers. This is relevant for all equations presented in Appendix 1.  
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Table A1.2. Regression results on the employment rate 
 Employment rate Low-skilled employment rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Cluster (Policy 1) 2.919*** 0.917*** 1.167*** 4.208*** 0.941** 1.850*** (0.473) (0.270) (0.346) (0.930) (0.454) (0.712) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
-3.201** -0.846 -0.832 -9.899*** 1.214 -0.908 
(1.590) (0.721) (0.724) (3.809) (1.252) (1.497) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
5.918*** 0.914 1.898** 11.07*** -0.777 1.577 
(1.516) (0.848) (0.967) (3.595) (1.481) (2.030) 
Cluster * PES allocation -0.381 -0.116 0.297 2.141* 1.026* 1.826** (0.524) (0.337) (0.378) (1.245) (0.593) (0.799) 
Cluster * Timing -2.154*** -0.711*** -0.791** -3.509*** -0.893** -1.638** (0.442) (0.254) (0.330) (0.883) (0.426) (0.682) 
PES allocation 10.35*** 2.163 4.120*** 15.48*** -3.743 2.443 (1.826) (1.432) (1.351) (4.431) (2.807) (3.012) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
0.144*** 0.232*** 0.191*** 0.393*** 0.180* 0.183** 
(0.0379) (0.0477) (0.0385) (0.0916) (0.0939) (0.0828) 
Correct timing of 
policies 
-2.662** -4.247*** -7.335*** -4.052* 
(1.248) (1.240) (2.159) (2.277) 
Cycle * Timing 0.000595** -0.000422 0.000891*** 2.16e-05*** -2.44e-05** 5.26e-06 (0.000240) (0.000563) (0.000267) (6.05e-06) (1.04e-05) (6.15e-06) 
Cycle -0.000589** 0.000428 -0.000884***    (0.000240) (0.000563) (0.000268)    
Growth rate of real 
GDP 
-0.531*** -0.185*** -0.0283 -0.590** -0.173** 0.0587 
(0.101) (0.0454) (0.0380) (0.247) (0.0799) (0.0796) 
Unemployment rate of 
the high skilled 
-0.916*** -1.057*** -0.768*** -0.507** -0.809*** -0.433** 
(0.0997) (0.0734) (0.0825) (0.219) (0.131) (0.182) 
Union density 0.0782*** -0.225*** 0.0730*** 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.117*** (0.0154) (0.0242) (0.0168) (0.0370) (0.0432) (0.0395) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
-0.660*** -0.504** -0.516** 4.067*** -0.125 2.381*** 
(0.234) (0.216) (0.206) (0.531) (0.374) (0.445) 
EU -10.12*** -9.932*** -11.59***  -10.10*** (0.575) (0.783) (1.249)  (1.744) 
Constant 75.53*** 82.02*** 78.57*** 46.16*** 49.58*** 49.36*** (1.982) (1.331) (1.783) (3.845) (2.409) (3.354) 
Observations 367 367 364 355 355 352 
R-squared 0.746 0.762 0.499 0.331 
Number of countries   30 27   30 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; 
***significant at 1 per cent. (1) Pooled ordinary least squares model (OLS); (2) GLS (either fixed- or random-effects); 
and (3) FGLS with AR1 correction. 
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Table A1.3. Regression results on the participation rate 
 Participation rate Low-skilled participation rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Cluster (Policy 1) 0.561*** -0.00223 0.340*** 5.338*** 0.223 1.360* (0.0617) (0.0451) (0.0535) (0.978) (0.479) (0.695) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
-3.169* -1.184* -1.481* -4.987 0.568 -0.0841 
(1.716) (0.674) (0.786) (3.917) (1.208) (1.404) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
5.774*** 1.357 0.587 8.335* 0.513 0.223 
(1.752) (0.889) (1.126) (4.272) (1.677) (2.130) 
Cluster * PES allocation 2.730** 1.552*** 1.736** (1.239) (0.580) (0.755) 
Cluster * Timing -4.957*** -0.551 -1.345** (0.940) (0.446) (0.665) 
PES allocation 8.395*** -2.154 3.540** 22.23*** -5.856** 0.550 (1.714) (1.381) (1.377) (4.412) (2.753) (2.867) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
0.0852*** 0.214*** 0.112*** 0.136** 0.190** 0.155** 
(0.0229) (0.0439) (0.0265) (0.0580) (0.0899) (0.0606) 
Correct timing of 
policies 
-4.681*** -3.748*** -1.006 -3.246 
(0.673) (0.794) (2.100) (2.172) 
Growth rate of real 
GDP 
-0.560*** -0.247*** -0.0705* -0.403 -0.204*** 0.0341 
(0.105) (0.0430) (0.0428) (0.246) (0.0781) (0.0762) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
0.0816*** 0.0369*** 0.0494*** -0.0901** 0.00879 -0.0572* 
(0.0146) (0.0112) (0.0139) (0.0372) (0.0219) (0.0304) 
Unemployment rate of 
the high skilled 
-0.230** -0.479*** -0.201** 0.291 -0.274** 0.0714 
(0.0963) (0.0616) (0.0840) (0.223) (0.131) (0.180) 
Union density 0.0848*** -0.102*** 0.0999*** 0.200*** 0.176*** 0.148*** (0.0142) (0.0278) (0.0156) (0.0376) (0.0516) (0.0390) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
-0.856*** -0.629*** -0.873*** 3.666*** -0.562 1.525*** 
(0.228) (0.234) (0.204) (0.533) (0.419) (0.437) 
EU -7.047*** -7.094*** -11.71*** -8.806*** (0.559) (0.691) (1.316) (1.784) 
Constant 73.80*** 81.50*** 76.04*** 44.05*** 54.10*** 57.05*** (1.492) (1.724) (1.461) (3.589) (3.175) (3.470) 
Observations 339 339 336 329 329 326 
R-squared 0.622 0.507 0.481 0.141 
Number of countries 30 27 30 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; 
***significant at 1 per cent. (1) Pooled ordinary least squares model (OLS); (2) GLS (either fixed- or random-effects); 
and (3) FGLS with AR1 correction. 
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Table A1.4. Regression results on the share of low-skilled unemployed individuals 
 Share of low skilled unemployed individuals 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Cluster (Policy 1) -3.044*** -2.431** -1.995** (1.008) (0.988) (0.955) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
5.036** 4.922** 2.287 
(2.483) (2.474) (2.008) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
-1.131 -1.099 0.175 
(4.222) (4.157) (3.734) 
Cluster * PES allocation 3.258** 3.505*** 1.816 (1.367) (1.335) (1.153) 
Cluster * Timing 1.892** 1.275 1.284 (0.939) (0.920) (0.903) 
PES allocation 2.203 1.831 -0.586 (5.921) (5.734) (4.553) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
-0.140 0.0215 -0.137 
(0.196) (0.137) (0.132) 
Correct timing of 
policies 
-6.246 -16.20** 
(7.092) (6.392) 
Growth rate of real 
GDP 
0.388** 0.318* 0.189 
(0.169) (0.167) (0.118) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
-0.00589 -0.0475 0.00387 
(0.0450) (0.0411) (0.0425) 
Unemployment rate of 
the high skilled 
-0.977*** -0.831*** -0.756*** 
(0.273) (0.264) (0.256) 
Union density 0.252** 0.186** 0.185* (0.106) (0.0865) (0.0976) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
3.059*** 3.342*** 1.652** 
(0.927) (0.858) (0.779) 
EU 0.235 -28.07*** (6.358) (5.960) 
Constant 27.66*** 37.26*** 60.95*** (6.714) (9.422) (6.493) 
Observations 309 309 306 
R-squared 0.928 
Number of countries 30 27 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; 
***significant at 1 per cent. (1) Pooled ordinary least squares model (OLS); (2) GLS (either fixed- or random-effects); 
and (3) FGLS with AR1 correction. Model (3) includes country dummies.	
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				Appendix	3:	Graphic	interpretation	of	the	different	interaction	effects	
Table A2.1. Moderating effect of timing on the relationship between policy 
cluster and the unemployment rate 
Table A2.2. Moderating effect of timing on the relationship between policy 
cluster and the low-skilled unemployment rate 
Table A2.3. Moderating effect of PES allocation on the relationship between 
policy cluster and the low-skilled unemployment rate 
Table A2.4. Moderating effect of timing on the relationship between policy 
cluster and the employment rate 
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Table A2.5. Moderating effect of timing on the relationship between the cycle 
and the employment rate 
Table A2.6. Moderating effect of timing on the relationship between policy 
cluster and the low-skilled employment rate 
Table A2.7. Moderating effect of PES allocation on the relationship between 
policy cluster and the low-skilled employment rate 
 
Table A2.8. Moderating effect of timing on the relationship between policy 
cluster and the low-skilled labour force participation rate 
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Table A2.9. Moderating effect of PES allocation on the relationship between the 
policy cluster and the low-skilled labour force participation 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the coefficients presented in the last columns of Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8. Figures are based on the worksheet presented in Dawson (2014). 
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Appendix	 4:	 Results	 of	 estimations	 using	 the	 variables	 on	 labour	 market	 structure	 as	 control	 variables	
(equations	1	to	14)	and	as	explanatory	variables	(equations	15	to	16) 
 
UNR 
(1) 
UNR 
(2) 
UNR_LSK 
(3) UNR_LSK (4) 
EMP RATE 
(5) 
EMP RATE 
(6) 
EMP RATE_LSK 
(7) 
EMP RATE_LSK 
(8)
Cluster (Policy 1) -2.023***  -2.968*** 1.167*** 1.850***  
(0.245)  (0.515) (0.346) (0.712)  
Job rotation and job sharing (Policy 2) -0.905  -0.231 -0.832 -0.908  
(0.554)  (1.164) (0.724) (1.497)  
Start-up incentives (Policy 3) -2.320*** -3.856** 1.898** 1.577
(0.740)  (1.725) (0.967) (2.030)  
Cluster * PES allocation -0.315  -1.089* 0.297 1.826**  
(0.278)  (0.601) (0.378) (0.799)  
Cluster * Timing 1.722***  2.675*** -0.791** -1.638**  
(0.238)  (0.494) (0.330) (0.682)  
PES allocation -4.096***  -2.633 4.120*** 2.443  
(1.018)  (2.251) (1.351) (3.012)  
Continuity in implementation 0.000143  -0.155** 0.191*** 0.183**  
(0.0146)  (0.0607) (0.0385) (0.0828)  
Correct timing of policies -2.930***  -3.625** -4.247*** -4.052*  
(0.810)  (1.543) (1.240) (2.277)  
Cycle * Timing -3.10e-06  -1.79e-05*** 0.000891*** 5.26e-06  
(2.01e-06)  (4.37e-06) (0.000267) (6.15e-06)  
Growth rate of real GDP -0.0569** -0.0354 -0.0283 0.0587
(0.0253)  (0.0622)  (0.0380)  (0.0796)  
Population with tertiary education 0.0240** -0.0110 0.0592*** -0.0259         
(0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0224) (0.0236)   
Unemployment rate of the high skilled         -0.768*** -0.832*** -0.433** -0.866*** 
    (0.0825) (0.0618) (0.182) (0.139) 
Union density 0.0212 0.0416** 0.00771 0.0394 0.0730*** -0.0327 0.117*** 0.0489 
(0.0145) (0.0171) (0.0259) (0.0353) (0.0168) (0.0233) (0.0395) (0.0431) 
EPL for temporary workers -0.101 -0.154 -1.079*** -0.580* -0.516** -0.652*** 2.381*** 0.953** 
(0.161) (0.179) (0.313) (0.338) (0.206) (0.188) (0.445) (0.385) 
EU 3.620***  6.752*** -9.932*** -10.10***  
(0.709)  (1.117) (0.783) (1.744)  
Constant 8.991*** 6.763*** 11.64*** 13.08*** 78.57*** 73.37*** 49.36*** 48.15*** 
(1.189) (1.045) (2.459) (2.077) (1.783) (1.015) (3.354) (1.883) 
Observations 452 533 336 370 364 399 352 384 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
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LFPR 
(9) 
LFPR 
 (10) 
LFPR_LSK 
(11) 
LFPR_LSK 
(12) 
Share of LSK 
UN (13) 
Share of LSK 
UN (14) 
Policy Cluster 
(15) 
Start-up 
incentives (16) 
Cluster (Policy 1) 0.340***  1.360* -1.995**  
(0.0535)  (0.695) (0.955)  
Job rotation and job sharing (Policy 2) -1.481*  -0.0841 2.287  
(0.786)  (1.404) (2.008)  
Start-up incentives (Policy 3) 0.587  0.223 0.175  
(1.126) (2.130) (3.734) 
Cluster * PES allocation  1.736** 1.816  
 (0.755) (1.153)  
Cluster * Timing  -1.345** 1.284  
 (0.665) (0.903)  
PES allocation 3.540**  0.550 -0.586  
(1.377)  (2.867) (4.553)  
Continuity in implementation 0.112***  0.155** -0.137  
(0.0265)  (0.0606) (0.132)  
Correct timing of policies -3.748***  -3.246 -16.20**  
(0.794)  (2.172) (6.392)  
Cycle * Timing    
   
Growth rate of real GDP -0.0705*  0.0341  0.189    
(0.0428) (0.0762) (0.118) 
Population with tertiary education 0.0494*** 0.0334*** -0.0572* -0.0181 0.00387 -0.0387 0.0353** 0.000614 
(0.0139) (0.0111) (0.0304) (0.0259) (0.0425) (0.0364) (0.0149) (0.000766) 
Unemployment rate of the high skilled -0.201** -0.184*** 0.0714 -0.251* -0.756*** -0.461** -0.468*** -0.0153*** 
(0.0840) (0.0518) (0.180) (0.132) (0.256) (0.190) (0.0744) (0.00418) 
Union density 0.0999*** 0.000104 0.148*** 0.0908** 0.185* 0.152* 0.0430* 0.000846 
(0.0156) (0.0217) (0.0390) (0.0403) (0.0976) (0.0912) (0.0242) (0.000985) 
EPL for temporary workers -0.873*** -0.688*** 1.525*** 0.458 1.652** 1.833*** -0.0400 0.00317 
(0.204) (0.160) (0.437) (0.364) (0.779) (0.576) (0.215) (0.0108) 
EU -7.094***  -8.806*** -28.07***  
(0.691)  (1.784) (5.960)  
Constant 76.04*** 72.95*** 57.05*** 52.03*** 60.95*** 49.56*** 3.121** 0.0988 
(1.461) (1.190) (3.470) (2.381) (6.493) (4.684) (1.396) (0.0640) 
Observations 336 370 326 357 306 335 364 367 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent. All models have been estimated by 
the baseline GLS (AR1) regression. UNR= unemployment rate; LSK= low-skilled; EMP RATE= employment rate; LFPR= labour force participation rate; UN= unemployed.  
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Appendix	5:	Checking	robustness	of	estimations	by	changing	the	sample	of	countries	and	the	window	of	time	
Unemployment rate Low-skilled unemployment rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cluster (Policy 1) -2.023*** -1.689*** -2.406*** -1.427*** -2.968*** -2.530*** -4.300*** -2.501*** (0.245) (0.267) (0.285) (0.281) (0.515) (0.599) (0.649) (0.608) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
-0.905 -1.328** -0.863 -0.679 -0.231 -1.068 0.247 0.265 
(0.554) (0.613) (0.672) (0.546) (1.164) (1.414) (1.592) (1.269) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
-2.320*** -2.365*** -2.349*** -1.704** -3.856** -3.525* -3.436 -2.572 
(0.740) (0.784) (0.897) (0.845) (1.725) (2.023) (2.281) (1.919) 
Cluster * PES allocation -0.315 -2.179*** 0.00385 -0.605* -1.089* -3.755*** -0.643 -1.591** (0.278) (0.597) (0.338) (0.346) (0.601) (1.387) (0.772) (0.762) 
Cluster * Timing 1.722*** 1.549*** 2.029*** 1.309*** 2.675*** 2.601*** 3.897*** 2.471*** -2.023*** -1.689*** -2.406*** (0.272) (0.494) (0.528) (0.620) (0.590) 
PES allocation -4.096*** -2.916*** -6.938*** -1.916 -2.633 -0.792 -7.722** 1.100 (1.018) (1.106) (1.382) (1.290) (2.251) (2.570) (3.063) (2.976) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
0.000143 0.00367 -0.0372 -0.166*** -0.155** -0.184*** -0.451*** -0.644*** 
(0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0379) (0.0538) (0.0607) (0.0644) (0.0833) (0.104) 
Correct timing of policies -2.930*** -2.084** -3.948*** -1.269 -3.625** -2.539 -3.758* -0.481 (0.810) (0.924) (1.026) (1.057) (1.543) (1.640) (2.165) (2.098) 
Cycle * Timing -3.10e-06 -4.08e-06* -7.64e-05 -9.55e-06*** -1.79e-05*** -2.08e-05*** -0.000224* -3.91e-05*** (2.01e-06) (2.20e-06) (7.93e-05) (3.08e-06) (4.37e-06) (4.55e-06) (0.000129) (6.02e-06) 
Growth rate of real GDP -0.0569** -0.0525* -0.0829** -0.0552* -0.0354 -0.00736 0.0460 -0.0240 (0.0253) (0.0269) (0.0370) (0.0330) (0.0622) (0.0723) (0.107) (0.0778) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
0.0240** 0.0294** 0.0214 0.0195 0.0592*** 0.0700*** 0.0465 0.0518* 
(0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0224) (0.0245) (0.0316) (0.0309) 
Union density 0.0212 0.0360* -0.000133 0.00743 0.00771 0.0263 -0.0115 -0.0125 (0.0145) (0.0185) (0.0146) (0.0162) (0.0259) (0.0320) (0.0277) (0.0318) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
-0.101 0.00187 0.320* 0.244 -1.079*** -1.105*** -0.401 -0.792* 
(0.161) (0.196) (0.188) (0.235) (0.313) (0.347) (0.406) (0.475) 
EU 3.620*** 3.505***  4.176*** 6.752*** 7.047*** 9.118*** (0.709) (0.810)  (0.664) (1.117) (1.133) (1.244) 
Constant 8.991*** 8.100*** 14.07*** 3.707** 11.64*** 9.609*** 17.37*** 0.380 (1.189) (1.340) (1.449) (1.775) (2.459) (2.647) (3.092) (3.522) 
Observations 452 384 302 210 336 293 224 207 
Number of countries 27 24 18 24 27 24 18 24 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent.  
(1) Baseline GLS (AR1) regression; (2) Excluding Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden; (3) Excluding non EU countries; (4) Reduced window of time: 2000–2010. 
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Employment rate Low-skilled employment rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cluster (Policy 1) 1.167*** 0.845** 1.334*** 1.162*** 1.850*** 1.287* 5.434*** 1.718* (0.346) (0.342) (0.422) (0.424) (0.712) (0.731) (0.933) (0.937) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
-0.832 -0.298 -1.313 -0.521 -0.908 -0.218 -2.984 -1.175 
(0.724) (0.750) (0.890) (0.734) (1.497) (1.578) (2.072) (1.860) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
1.898** 1.017 2.694** 0.884 1.577 0.416 3.131 0.0123 
(0.967) (0.949) (1.182) (0.993) (2.030) (2.050) (2.665) (2.504) 
Cluster * PES allocation 0.297 2.433*** 0.295 0.967** 1.826** 5.273*** 1.282 3.276*** (0.378) (0.712) (0.478) (0.462) (0.799) (1.545) (1.058) (1.162) 
Cluster * Timing -0.791** -0.649** -0.938** -0.977** -1.638** -1.503** -4.904*** -1.800** (0.330) (0.305) (0.402) (0.401) (0.682) (0.662) (0.887) (0.895) 
PES allocation 4.120*** 3.731*** 6.011*** 5.736*** 2.443 1.055 14.54*** 5.308 (1.351) (1.320) (1.994) (1.861) (3.012) (3.026) (4.375) (4.625) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
0.191*** 0.212*** 0.222*** 0.377*** 0.183** 0.144* 0.497*** 0.716*** 
(0.0385) (0.0354) (0.0530) (0.0704) (0.0828) (0.0798) (0.114) (0.174) 
Correct timing of policies -4.247*** -6.350*** -4.129** -5.019*** -4.052* -5.630** 0.0531 -7.808** (1.240) (1.148) (1.621) (1.750) (2.277) (2.361) (3.047) (3.353) 
Cycle * Timing 0.000891*** 0.00112*** 0.000262 0.000786*** 5.26e-06 4.04e-06 -0.000302 3.23e-05*** (0.000267) (0.000245) (0.000671) (0.000301) (6.15e-06) (6.12e-06) (0.000190) (9.85e-06) 
Growth rate of real GDP -0.0283 -0.0187 -0.0247 -7.70e-07** 0.0587 0.0638 0.0176 0.0649 (0.0380) (0.0373) (0.0582) (3.00e-07) (0.0796) (0.0797) (0.137) (0.113) 
Unemployment rate of the 
high skilled 
-0.768*** -0.740*** -0.857*** -0.00912 -0.433** -0.312* 0.184 -0.232 
(0.0825) (0.0792) (0.117) (0.0436) (0.182) (0.183) (0.246) (0.310) 
Union density 0.0730*** -0.00731 0.0968*** -0.483*** 0.117*** 0.0475 0.153*** 0.137*** (0.0168) (0.0186) (0.0198) (0.129) (0.0395) (0.0490) (0.0394) (0.0498) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
-0.516** -0.519** -0.402 0.103*** 2.381*** 2.434*** 1.689*** 3.772*** 
(0.206) (0.207) (0.274) (0.0199) (0.445) (0.483) (0.589) (0.767) 
EU -9.932*** -10.94*** -0.646* -10.10*** -11.44*** -12.40*** (0.783) (0.720) (0.332) (1.744) (1.834) (1.977) 
Constant 78.57*** 81.88*** 67.66*** -10.36*** 49.36*** 50.79*** 32.29*** 54.76*** (1.783) (1.689) (2.209) (0.868) (3.354) (3.432) (4.258) (5.472) 
Observations 364 320 239 225 352 308 239 222 
Number of countries 27 24 18 26 27 24 18 26 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent.  
(1) Baseline GLS (AR1) regression; (2) Excluding Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden; (3) Excluding non EU countries; (4) Reduced window of time: 
2000–2010. 
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Participation rate Low-skilled participation rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cluster (Policy 1) 0.340*** 0.467*** 0.261*** 0.466*** 1.360* 0.898 5.267*** 2.674*** (0.0535) (0.0767) (0.0587) (0.0643) (0.695) (0.714) (0.946) (0.948) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
-1.481* -1.113* -1.314* -1.115 -0.0841 0.426 -1.822 -0.462 
(0.786) (0.675) (0.712) (0.992) (1.404) (1.476) (2.138) (1.830) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
0.587 -0.873 0.118 -0.678 0.223 -0.719 3.080 -1.681 
(1.126) (0.975) (1.090) (1.393) (2.130) (2.180) (3.092) (2.797) 
Cluster * PES allocation     1.736** 4.543*** 1.819* 3.028***     (0.755) (1.517) (1.051) (1.151) 
Cluster * Timing     -1.345** -1.245* -4.935*** -2.854***     (0.665) (0.643) (0.899) (0.915) 
PES allocation 3.540** 3.789*** 1.393 8.074*** 0.550 -0.547 14.96*** 8.909* (1.377) (1.170) (1.577) (1.857) (2.867) (2.875) (4.347) (4.607) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
0.112*** 0.115*** 0.134*** 0.143*** 0.155** 0.130** 0.537*** 0.281*** 
(0.0265) (0.0246) (0.0440) (0.0310) (0.0606) (0.0605) (0.106) (0.0854) 
Correct timing of policies -3.748*** -4.329*** -6.217*** -4.293*** -3.246 -4.907** -1.997 -0.944 (0.794) (0.807) (1.072) (0.923) (2.172) (2.258) (2.698) (2.823) 
Growth rate of real GDP -0.0705* -0.0328 -0.0599 -0.0876 0.0341 0.0411 -0.00501 0.0112 (0.0428) (0.0345) (0.0478) (0.0619) (0.0762) (0.0766) (0.143) (0.114) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
0.0494*** 0.0448*** 0.0617*** 0.0794*** -0.0572* -0.0554* -0.0505 -0.0561 
(0.0139) (0.0128) (0.0201) (0.0196) (0.0304) (0.0312) (0.0448) (0.0486) 
Unemployment rate of the 
high skilled 
-0.201** -0.146** -0.222** 0.239 0.0714 0.189 1.015*** 0.571* 
(0.0840) (0.0728) (0.0987) (0.155) (0.180) (0.181) (0.250) (0.322) 
Union density 0.0999*** 0.0229 0.129*** 0.0860*** 0.148*** 0.0848* 0.220*** 0.193*** (0.0156) (0.0191) (0.0194) (0.0187) (0.0390) (0.0480) (0.0374) (0.0508) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
-0.873*** -1.012*** -0.469** -1.257*** 1.525*** 1.504*** 1.229** 2.835*** 
(0.204) (0.198) (0.239) (0.324) (0.437) (0.475) (0.588) (0.779) 
EU -7.094*** -7.581*** -8.267*** -8.806*** -10.14*** -13.85*** (0.691) (0.709) (0.784) (1.784) (1.868) (2.096) 
Constant 76.04*** 78.26*** 69.38*** 73.56*** 57.05*** 58.63*** 38.08*** 52.57*** (1.461) (1.411) (1.860) (1.824) (3.470) (3.609) (4.525) (4.508) 
Observations 336 293 224 207 326 283 224 204 
Number of countries 27 24 18 24 27 24 18 24 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent.  
(1) Baseline GLS (AR1) regression; (2) Excluding Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden; (3) Excluding non EU countries; (4) Reduced window of time: 2000–
2010. 
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Share of low skilled unemployed individuals 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cluster (Policy 1) -1.995** -3.099*** -0.00568 -0.486 (0.955) (1.044) (0.758) (1.391) 
Job rotation and job 
sharing (Policy 2) 
2.287 2.652 2.977* 2.175 
(2.008) (2.222) (1.537) (2.020) 
Start-up incentives 
(Policy 3) 
0.175 0.344 6.322** -17.65*** 
(3.734) (4.420) (2.975) (5.350) 
Cluster * PES allocation 1.816 3.315 3.331*** 0.491 (1.153) (2.375) (0.924) (1.339) 
Cluster * Timing 1.284 1.329 -0.821 0.726 (0.903) (0.915) (0.714) (1.337) 
PES allocation -0.586 -3.931 -1.194 -0.949 (4.553) (4.822) (4.076) (6.518) 
Continuity in 
implementation 
-0.137 -0.150 -0.197* -25.23*** 
(0.132) (0.132) (0.106) (2.621) 
Correct timing of policies -16.20** -7.337 -10.66 146.4*** (6.392) (6.181) (6.646) (20.30) 
Growth rate of real GDP 0.189 0.238* 0.245** 0.147 (0.118) (0.125) (0.112) (0.136) 
Population with tertiary 
education 
0.00387 0.0736 -0.196*** 0.0710 
(0.0425) (0.0464) (0.0475) (0.0616) 
Unemployment rate of the 
high skilled 
-0.756*** -0.926*** 0.174 -1.743*** 
(0.256) (0.264) (0.232) (0.437) 
Union density 0.185* 0.201* 0.103 0.0473 (0.0976) (0.105) (0.106) (0.169) 
EPL for temporary 
workers 
1.652** 1.990** 0.414 -2.315 
(0.779) (0.914) (0.604) (1.518) 
EU -28.07*** -17.84*** -51.84*** (5.960) (5.553) (9.334) 
Constant 60.95*** 48.93*** 41.14*** -348.0*** (6.493) (9.460) (6.483) (40.72) 
Observations 306 266 202 201 
Number of countries 27 24 18 24 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent.  
(1) Baseline GLS (AR1) regression with country dummies; (2) Excluding Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden; (3) Excluding non EU countries; (4) Reduced 
window of time: 2000–2010. 
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Appendix	6:	Results	of	IV	estimations	(2SLS) 
 
 
Unemployment 
rate 
Low-skilled 
unemployment 
rate
Employment 
rate 
Low-skilled 
employment 
rate 
Participation 
rate 
Low-skilled  
participation 
rate
Share of low 
skilled 
unemployed
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Cluster (Policy 1) -0.594*** -0.776*** 0.725* 1.117*** 0.809** 1.734*** -1.636*** (0.0872) (0.183) (0.423) (0.223) (0.325) (0.469) (0.617) 
Job rotation and job sharing (Policy 2) 7.559*** 7.996** 27.01 -9.628** 30.30** 0.688 -27.95** (2.812) (3.989) (16.59) (4.657) (13.16) (22.61) (14.05) 
Start-up incentives (Policy 3) -4.099*** -11.54*** 7.809*** 4.389 2.600 19.33*** -46.79*** (1.563) (2.227) (3.015) (2.939) (2.748) (3.983) (11.54) 
PES allocation -12.17*** -21.83*** 6.399 10.13** 1.174 30.88*** -103.9*** (2.025) (4.328) (4.006) (4.394) (2.583) (5.527) (18.24) 
Continuity in implementation -0.487*** -0.683*** 0.568*** 0.281 0.0134 0.810** -1.956**(0.0787) (0.182) (0.191) (0.235) (0.125) (0.354) (0.840) 
Correct timing of policies 6.647*** 5.558** -13.75*** -20.10*** -12.63*** -15.67*** -11.41(0.986) (2.205) (3.807) (3.039) (2.831) (5.078) (9.284) 
Constant 7.932*** 15.20*** 95.74*** 56.76*** 91.01*** 56.46*** 103.6*** (1.573) (3.482) (6.976) (4.055) (3.040) (6.754) (12.32) 
Observations 226 175 314 175 314 305 156 
R-squared 0.422 0.478 0.320 0.690 0.068 0.359 0.134 
Underidentification test          
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic) 61.5*** 30.49*** 22.39*** 40.94*** 21.25*** 21.29*** 16.37*** 
Weak-instrument-robust inference 
(Anderson-Rubin Wald test) 79.82*** 58.94*** 73.12*** 152.8*** 39.32*** 37.73*** 105.66*** 
Overidentification test of all instruments 
(Hansen J statistic) 5.832 5.675 6.19 7.65 4.599 2.671 1.933 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: *significant at 10 per cent; **significant at 5 per cent; ***significant at 1 per cent.  
All models have been estimated by 2SLS, using gmm and robust options to compute efficient estimates in presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The exception 
is (7) where the robust option was not used. 
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